William Childs Westmoreland departed Saigon for the last time on 9 June 1968, having commanded MACV since August 1964. In that time, more than 30,000 Americans had died in Vietnam or elsewhere in the war zone. As COMUSMACV, Westmoreland had overseen not only U.S. combat operations but also the huge logistical buildup of American and allied forces in Vietnam. As of 1 July 1968, MACV reported 528,840 U.S. service personnel of all branches in the Republic of Vietnam. Another fifty thousand or so manned ships in the surrounding waters or were stationed on Thai air bases. The U.S. had spent more than 1.5 billion dollars on military construction in Vietnam. Another 386 million had gone to build bases in Thailand.
Westmoreland left Vietnam under a cloud that did not dissipate with the passing of time. Whatever personal misgivings he may have harbored, he had faithfully hewed to the party line before Congress and the American people. As the Washington Post put it, Westmoreland had been “a good soldier in an almost impossible spot.” In his Report on the War in Vietnam, written as he prepared to relinquish command, he had labelled 1968 as “The Year of Decision.” It proved to be just that, but the verdict was not to be what he hoped or imagined. South Vietnam had survived, but the Tet Offensive not only undercut his personal credibility but further weakened the already shaky support for the war. Henceforth Washington’s objective would be to negotiate an end to the fighting, execute a face-saving withdrawal, and somehow leave behind a non-communist South Vietnam.
General Abrams’ “One War”
Westmoreland's designated successor was Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, who had already served as deputy COMUSMACV for more than a year. “Abe,” as he was called by his friends and close associates, was, like Westmoreland, a West Point graduate, both of them in the class of '36. Although he would not officially take over until 3 July, in Westmoreland's absence he had essentially been running the show since early June. Outwardly at least, Abrams presented a marked contrast to his rather straight-laced predecessor. Commander of a WWII tank outfit in George Patton's Third Army, Abrams brought to mind much of the outspoken, no-nonsense qualities of his one-time boss. Although he would labor under the same precepts and constraints that had frustrated Westmoreland, Abrams characterized MACV’s mission differently. Most significantly, he would preach the concept of "one war", wherein equal emphasis was put on military operations, improvement of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and pacification, "all of which are interrelated so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in the others." After the urban destruction wrought during the enemy offensives, Abrams counseled his subordinates against excessive use of artillery and airstrikes, warning that the attendant, if unintentional, loss of life and property among noncombatants won no friends and ultimately benefitted the communists.
The Situation in July
Westmoreland had recently eschewed the term “search and destroy” in favor of more politically palatable language. Whatever fhe semantics, Abrams saw no reason to change the tactics. “The critical problem for us,” as he saw it, was “to determine a practical way to inflict significant attrition on [the enemy]; to grab hold of him and to destroy him. This is the payoff—to kill the enemy.” Communist forces had unquestionably suffered heavy losses in the Tet offensive and the "Mini-Tet'' which followed, with little to show for the sacrifice. No general uprising had occurred, and in fact the South Vietnamese were gaining strength. Enemy action slackened noticeably as NVA main force units retreated into their Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries to rest and refit. Decades later, the authors of The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam admitted that ”because the time allotted was short and absolute secrecy had to be maintained, our preparations of supplies, spiritual preparations, and preparation of tactics were all insufficient. Our plan for military attacks was too simplistic and our arrangements for carrying out and coordinating combat operations by our forces for coordination between the battlefields and between the military attack and the mass uprisings were disjointed. Our soldiers’ morale had been very high when they set off for battle, but because we had made only one-sided preparations, only looking at the possibilities of victory and failing to prepare for adversity, when the battle did not progress favorably for our side and when we suffered casualties, rightist thoughts, pessimism, and hesitancy appeared among our forces.”
Meabwhile, Abrams emphatically endorsed the closing of Khe Sanh combat base, but because that would undoubtedly beg the question of why it was held in the first place, the move had to be made with as little fanfare as possible. In explanation, Abrams pointed to the renewed build-up of enemy forces in I CTZ and the need to free up as many mobile battalions as possible to counter the threat. The last troops at Khe Sanh were evacuated without incident on 7 July. The abandonment of Khe Sanh in effect spelled the end of the “McNamara Line” and the idea of a manned infiltration barrier. The marines, for their part, were more than happy to shed the role of fish in the proverbial barrel.
Status -- Third Phase Offensive
The badly mauled VC shied away from close combat, instead vowing to blast Saigon with “100 rockets a day for 100 days.” Reality was starkly different. For the week ending 13 July, MACV announced the lowest US KIA count [118] since October, 1967. The 13th marked a month in Saigon with zero rocket attacks. [TRUE?]
Farewell Drill Press/Sentinel Sara
Among the mission changes taking effect in late 1968 was the decommissioning of the two SENTINEL SARA aircraft which, under the original DRILL PRESS project, had initiated the Air Force’s in-country airborne SIGINT effort in 1966. Driven from Phu Bai during the Tet Offensive, the Sentinel Sara birds migrated to Pleiku. On 15 August, they were placed under operational control of Det. 2, although Det. 1 apparently furnished many of the crew.
Plans for the Combat Cougar “Zulu” (Z1/Z2) configured EC-47s to absorb the COMINT collection mission had been in the works for some time. NSA was not convinced. In August, a test utilizing “Zulu” aircraft to intercept and exploit low level enemy communications was initiated in III Corps. Thanks to “lack of technical data, operator experience, feedback, etc.,” results were deemed “far from promising” and the project was discontinued. Yet a follow-up trial with one of the Sentinel Sara aircraft, intermingling its experienced crew with local operators, proved so successful that it was continued until mid-October. But once in motion, bureaucratic wheels rarely stop turning. On 6 December, Sentinel Sara flew her last mission. The Gooney Birds themselves were relics worthy of veneration, having been the very first USAF airborne COMINT platforms, cobbled together during the Korean War. Stripped of the intercept equipment, they reverted to general purpose “hack” transports. Their eventual fates are unclear; 254 went to the VNAF in 1972, with 680 perhaps ending up with the Cambodian Air Force.
Termination of the Sentinel Sara operation obviated the need for airborne analysts (A202XX) to fill the Airborne Mission Supervisor (AMS) role, although those already in-country would remain for the duration of their assignments.
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