HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

July – December
1970

The EC-47 History Site

[redacted]

ON FILM

HISTORY

OF

DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 July - 31 December 1970

RCS: USS-D3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

[redacted]

31 December 1970

[redacted]

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

[redacted]

USAFSS FORM 1 JUN 57 86

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

01 July - 31 December 1970

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Approved by:

James R. Clapper, Jr.

JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF
Commander

FOREWORD

This history summarizes the continued operational activities of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron. Activities between the unit's beginning on 4 April 1969 and 30 June 1970 are available in the AU-D5, AU-D5(USS-1), and USS-D3 reports for that period.

This history was prepared by TSgt Ronald L. Schofield while fulfilling the position of Unit Historian as an additional duty. All comments and suggestions concerning this history are welcomed and should be directed to the Historian, Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron.

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 31 December 1970

Captain James R. Clapper, Jr.	Commander
Captain Lewis DeLaura	Operations Officer
SMSgt William Schaule	NCOIC Operations
MSgt Robert E. Edwards	NCOIC Airborne Operations
MSgt Floyd L. Case	First Sergeant
MSgt Herbert E. Wallace	NCOIC Communications
MSgt James P. Hart	NCOIC Exploitation
TSgt Bruce W. Senter	NCOIC Personnel
TSgt Dennis L. McDowell	NCOIC Materiel
TSgt Gerald D. Hoag	NCOIC Mission Management
TSgt Robert H. Tucker	NCOIC Training
TSgt Donald L. Whitman	NCOIC Standardization/Evaluation
SSgt Larry J. Johnson	NCOIC Administration
SSgt Randy D. Myers	NCOIC Security

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[redacted]

[redacted]

CC
Commander
Capt Clapper

DA
Administration
SSgt Johnson

IM
Maintenance
TSgt McDowell

DO
Operations
Capt DeLaura

DC
Communications
MSgt Wallace

DP
Personnel
TSgt Senter

First Sgt
MSgt Case

DMS
Supply
TSgt Swinney

DORTS
Stan/Eval
TSgt Whitman

DOR
ARDF Operations
SMSgt Schaule

DPT
Training
TSgt Tucker

DORM
Mission Mgt
TSgt Hoag

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DORT
Airborne Opns
MSgt Edwards

Flight
TSgt Ramey

DORTX
Analysis & Rptg
MSgt Hart

Reports
TSgt
Gardisky

Language
AIC
Samppala

Airborne
SSgt
Kessler

A Flight
SSgt
Nemeth

B Flight
TSgt
Jordan

C Flight
TSgt
Michaels

D Flight
TSgt
Ryon

[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq

Van Complex




A.D.P.
Room 201
Analysis and Reporting
A/G/A Radios
Data Preparation (2 psns)
Transcription (3 psns)
Room 205
Airborne Operations
Room 206
Crew Briefing
A.F. A.D.P.
Room 209
Stan/Eval
Room 210
Mission
Management
Room 211
Commanders
Office
Room 213
Training
Room 214
Security
Room 212
Ops Officer
NCOIC Operations
Admin

Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq

Maintenance/Supply Building and Van



Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq
Project NKP 108-0
Maintenance and Supply Building



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CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

The following is a review of mission, organization, and command developments within the Detachment during this reporting period.

Executive

(U) Captain James R. Clapper, Jr., who assumed command of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron on 22 June 1970, continued in this position. With the assignment of Captain Lewis DeLaura on 16 September 1970, the unit's first PCS Operations Officer, Captain Clapper ceased performing the dual function of Commander and Operations Officer.

Mission

[redacted] Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron continued as an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) conducting Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and Airborne Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection in support of requirements defined by Controlled American Source (CAS), Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and Military Assistance Command Thailand (MACT). To fulfill these requirements, the detachment was charged with conducting ARDF and COMINT collection activities against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Forces operating in Laos. The detachment continued to provide qualified airborne personnel to operate the USAFSS equipment installed in five EC-47 aircraft which were provided on a rotating TDY basis to Detachment 1, 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron. Throughout this period, the unit flew four missions per day over Laos, with the emphasis on the Barrel Roll area.

The detachment's secondary mission of timely air-ground communications support to Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platforms (ARPs) operating over Laos continued throughout this period.

Organization

[redacted] Throughout this period Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron was directly subordinated to the 6994th Security Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Operational control of the ARDF and Communications Collection effort continued to be exercised by MACV thru the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) with technical control exercised by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) thru USM-7, the Collection Management Authority (CMA) for the bulk of the unit's mission.

The Command lines were as follows:

Headquarters, United States Air Force Security Service

Headquarters, Pacific Security Region

[redacted]

[redacted]

6994th Security Squadron

Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron

This period was highlighted by virtually a complete change in Det 3's physical facilities. Most of the operations functions were moved into a portion of the Task Force Alpha (TFA) building on 25 October; the Maintenance and Supply functions were moved into a new permanent facility on 23 September; and 40 aircrew members were moved into a newly airconditioned dormitory on 7 December 1970.

Move of Det 3, 6994th Scty Sq into TFA Building

[redacted] At the outset of this period, Det 3 was still operating in an eight H-1 van complex adjacent to the TFA building. At Pac Scty Rgn and PACAF, staffing efforts had been underway for some time to establish a permanent facility for the unit. Initially, the approach was to build a new, permanent facility within the TFA compound, but separate from the TFA building itself. Accordingly, the host base civil engineers had processed a $90,000 MCP project for a new building. However when the formal request and proposed plans reached Hq PACAF, General Nazzaro, CINCPACAF, personally intervened in the situation by disapproving the $90,000 MCP project in favor of some cheaper arrangement whereby Det 3 would be moved into the TFA building itself. TFA had undergone a strength reduction, at least partially attributable to the loss of one of its two IBM 360/65 processing computers. Accordingly, PACAF had directed, through 13AF, that a survey be conducted at TFA to determine what space might be available and the feasibility of Det 3 occupying a portion of the TFA building after their reduction.

A series of studies then ensued during the early summer. At one point TFA offered five Porta-Kamp type trailers which had been installed adjacent to the TFA administration building, but this was deemed unacceptable to USAFSS since it would not represent much of an improvement over the H-1 vans. The Pac Scty Rgn position had been that based on computations derived from USAFSSM 86-1, 4,000 square feet of unfragmented, contiguous space in a separate area was required.

The project remained virtually on dead center until 14 August 1970. On that date General Nazzaro, CINCPACAF, visited NKP and together with Major General Campbell, Chief of Staff, interviewed Captain Clapper about the move. The upshot of this discussion was that General Nazzaro desired that Det 3 be moved into the TFA building -- regardless of the nature of the operational relationship between the two organizations.

This session of course stimulated serious negotiations between the Commander of TFA, Colonel George Lutz, his staff, and Captain Clapper. After an initial impasse, TFA proposed that Det 3 be accommodated in a portion of the building which had not been previously addressed. Specifically, they offered a total of 3,562 usable square feet at one end of building 2407.

[redacted]

[redacted]

This offer was favorably received, since from the standpoint of functional layout, Det 3 could virtually move into the rooms as already configured, with only relatively minor changes, which could readily be made by the BCE. Essentially, the area earmarked for Det 3 only had to be separated from the remainder of the TFA building. This involved (1) construction of a wall to divide the remainder of the computer room (to be used for Det 3's Analysis and Reporting section, including OPSCOMMS, Air-Ground radio facility, and transcribe and "poker" positions); (2) installation of a wall partition in the hallway with a cipher-lock secured door; (3) securing the whole area with a wall-to-true ceiling barbed wire barrier and a pattern of welded crossbars from the true floor of the building to the false floor. No air-conditioning modifications were required since the equipment installed for the TFA computer was more than sufficient.

Some question arose over the arrangement for the communications installation. Alternatives discussed included (1) procuring a crane to raise the two comm vans over the revetment surrounding TFA in order to butt them up against the building; and (2) eventually installing KW-26s in the TFA AFSSO. It was finally decided to leave the comm vans in their original location, and walk between the Det 3 portion of TFA and the vans, until new OPSCOMMS and KW-26s could be installed in the building. BCE actually started work on the building modifications on 21 September 1970 and completed their work on 23 October. All Det 3 operations functions (except communications and air-ground radios) were moved into the TFA building on 25 October 1970.[1]

New Maintenance and Supply Building

[redacted] Under NKP construction Project 108-0, Det 3 was provided a new Maintenance and Supply building to upgrade the 400 square feet facility in the base PMEL building. The building design had been approved in January at a cost of $14,900. However, in late June Det 3 personnel discovered serious discrepancies in the specifications of the contract, principally in the area of power supplies required for test equipment. The BCE managed to include some last-minute changes in the contract in order to correct the deficiencies. After the building was completed still more shortcomings were found; i.e., the airconditioning did not provide sufficient cooling and the internal wiring was incorrect. Finally, the building was completed and the unit Maintenance and Supply functions moved into the new facility on 23 September 1970.[2]

New Dormitories

(U) During the course of negotiating renewal of the AFR 11-4 Host-Tenant agreement with the 56th SOW DM staff, the issue of providing air-conditioned dormitory spaces for Det 3's enlisted aircrew members arose. The result of these negotiations was that Det 3 was granted sufficient room for 40 aircrew members in newly-rehabbed building 2946. They moved from the "old" barracks area (buildings 1605/1606) into their new quarters on 7 December 1970.[3]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

Personnel Authorizations

[redacted] Officers

AFSC	Authorized	Assigned
A8035	1	1
E8035	1	1
Total	2	2

Enlisted

AFSC	Authorized	Assigned
A29292	1	1
A292X1	35	34
A202X0	13	14
R202X0	11	9
A203X1MD	6	7
A203X1MU	2	0
R301X3	8	5
R291X0	4	4
R363X0	1	1
R10070	1	1
R732X0	1	1
R645X0	2	1
R702X0	2	3
Total	88	81

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

CHAPTER II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

(U) The following is an account of the highlights of activities within the Airborne Operations section of this detachment during the period of this report.

Engineering Study

[redacted] An engineering study of UHF/VHF and HF noise problems aboard EC-47 aircraft was conducted during July to determine if the UHF-2 transceivers caused interference on the "X", "Y", and "Z" consoles.[4]

The noise test was conducted on six frequencies on four of our rotational aircraft. The results were inconsistent; on one aircraft (979) the "X" position experienced interference on the 7 and 8 bands; on another (703) all HF receivers experienced 3 to 5 percent noise on all freqs; on a third (925), both "Z" positions displayed interference on one frequency and the 422 scope evidenced heavy interference on frequency 289.6 MHz; the fourth aircraft (158) experienced no interference.[5]

Downloading/Uploading Zulu Consoles

[redacted] The requirement levied on the detachment's maintenance personnel during May to upload and download the Zulu consoles at NKP to avoid having Zulu consoles committed to aircraft transitioning to and from this unit was terminated during August. The termination of this requirement resulted in a savings of 60 manhours per week.[6]

Maintenance of ALR-38 System at NKP

[redacted] In preparation for a possible deployment of the ALR-38 system to NKP, Hq USAF directed AFLC to procure a partial set of ALR-38 AGE to support a second operating location here. One of the following items of Peculiar AGE were to be procured: VHF receiver test set, phase measure test set, Calgate test set. In addition, six extender modules, two input simulators, and two diagnostic tapes were also to be obtained.

In addition to these, AFLC was to procure additional system spares and spare parts for Peculiar AGE items, but an ALR-38 bench mockup was not to be procured for NKP. It was apparently envisioned that the maintenance concept at NKP would be change-out and replace modules within the capability of the AGE items listed and return the remaining reparables to Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq at DaNang Airbase, RVN, for repair or further return to Sanders for depot repair.

It was not known at that time when the additional ALR-38 AGE items would be delivered to NKP or when ALR-38-trained maintenance personnel would be

[redacted]

[redacted]

available, but the assumed time frame would be sometime in 4Q71 or 1Q72.[7]

USAFSS informed Pac Scty Rgn that the estimated delivery was scheduled for late December 1970 or early January 1971 and added that ALR-38 training would be included in the AZK30173-1 course at Goodfellow AFB beginning in the ninth week of the course.[8]

ALR-38 Aircraft Basing

[redacted] With regard to the question of basing the ALR-38 at NKP, PACAF planned, through 7AF, to obtain MACV concurrence for a one-for-one trade of the AN/ALR-38-configured EC-47Q aircraft for the five ALR-34-configured EC-47N/P aircraft which stage from NKP. The ALR-38-configured aircraft were to operate on a TDY rotational basis to NKP as do the present ALR-34-configured aircraft.[9]

The 6994th Scty Sq anticipated that the operators for the ALR-38s for NKP would initially come from Det 2 at DaNang. They would be responsible for training Det 3 operators. The 6994th Scty Sq did not think that five ALR-38 aircraft could be adequately supported at NKP until at least May 71, when additional trained maintenance personnel would be on board. They thought that perhaps one or two ALR-38 aircraft could be supported on a "black box exchange" basis, but would rather begin with one ALR-38 if this concept of operation was adopted on an interim basis.[10]

Det 2 stated that they could adequately provide operators to train Det 3 personnel. They felt that two IROs per aircraft would be sufficient to conduct a short ground orientation course and fly with Det 3 operators. Det 2's standard practice was to require their AMSs to fly ten missions under Stan/Eval supervision before they operate the ALR-38 alone, since the "X" position is the only significant equipment which required thorough familiarization. They also stated that they realized that proper navigator training was equally important as the training of ROs and maintenance personnel. They felt that the same training criteria that applies to the navigators would apply to the ROs.

Det 2 did not concur with supporting one aircraft in a "black box exchange", since from their past experience, "one-of-a-kind" maintenance is difficult to support. Even with complete support in "black boxes", a surprisingly large number of repair actions were required for relays, switches, and connectors. Det 2 maintained that the time-consuming part of the ALR-38 system maintenance was employing test procedures and adjustment/alignment procedures.[11]

This detachment concurred with Det 2 and suggested that a ALR-38-qualified training team from Goodfellow AFB be dispatched for a 30-day TDY rather than burden Det 2 with an additional training load for our maintenance technicians.[12]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ARDF Technical Support Test

[redacted] NSAPAC Rep Vietnam (NRV)(C) implemented a 60-day ARDF technical support test with the tasking period beginning 24 October 1970. The concept called for the provision of technical support to ARDF resources with priority one and special emphasis targets only. The theory was that by limiting technical data ("cherry sheets") to only those targets of primary interest that provided reliable communications schedules, missions could be more efficiently planned from both a position and time standpoint to better satisfy mission requirements. In order to continue coverage of secondary target activity, a "modified vacuum cleaner" operation would also be employed. It was anticipated that ample coverage of all other priority targets would be possible during "modified vacuum cleaner" operations in view of the limited number of priority one and special emphasis targets to appear on the "cherry sheets". The operators would begin searching for targets of opportunity to "vacuum clean" during those periods when they were not working "cherry sheet" targets or ground-to-air tipoffs. The NSA identification aid was to provide technical data on all known communications in the area and would be used during "modified vacuum cleaner" operations to avoid multiple fixes of the same target.

The test was to be conducted in two phases and would be applicable to all SEA units participating in the ARDF program (except for Left Bank and the VNAF); phase one required that all units adhere strictly to the procedures as outlined. After 20 days of the test period had elapsed, all units submitted to NRV(C) their recommendations to modify procedures for phase two of the test to more closely suit the circumstances prevalent for each area and/or unit.

The "cherry sheets" were limited to only those priority one and special emphasis targets having a high probability of meeting predicted schedules. Only schedules, frequencies, and callsigns which were confirmed through current intercept were included. Listings of multiple targets for the same scheduled time were generally discouraged unless the targets' last known locations were in proximity to one another. In those instances where multiple targets for the same schedule were listed, the targets were listed in order of importance. The determining factor was normally to place targets in order of importance by last fix date; i.e., targets with the oldest fix date were placed before those which had more recent fix dates (special emphasis targets took priority over priority one targets).

Selection of mission area targets was normally limited to those targets with a last known location in the designated mission area. Targets located outside, but in the vicinity of, the mission area would also be considered for inclusion, particularly if they were not within the area of another scheduled mission or had reliable schedules which were not covered by the time-over-targets of missions scheduled over their location.

[redacted]

[redacted]

"Cherry sheet" data included scheduled activity up to one hour beyond indicated mission termination time. This allowed technical data to be available for those missions which had a late takeoff time for the extended period.

Prior to takeoff a complete check was made of secure communications gear. If crews were unable to communicate in the secure mode, all efforts were made to correct the deficiency, including replacing the gear, if possible.

Aviation units were to prepare a mission profile based on the "cherry sheet" data to allow the most advantageous positioning of the aircraft to work as many priority one and special emphasis targets as possible. All priority one and special emphasis targets were worked in the order listed on the "cherry sheet". Search for "cherry sheet" targets was to begin three minutes prior to and three minutes following the indicated schedule.

If the target was not observed during the period and no other priorities appeared on the "cherry sheet" as active in the area being worked, the "modified vacuum cleaner" mode of operation was effected. The aircraft remained in the general vicinity as long as feasible before proceeding to the next scheduled target location. This enabled the mission aircraft to respond to ground-to-air tipoffs for "cherry sheet" targets that became active subsequent to predicted schedules.

During the 60-day test period each CMA forwarded a daily report which was titled "Target Deviation Report". It listed all "cherry sheet" targets by target number, reference designator, and scheduled time that failed to meet predicted callsigns, scheduled times, or frequencies. The report was segmented by mission and included the aircraft time-over-target. Target Deviation Reports were released at priority precedence as soon as possible following recovery of the last mission flown in the CMA area of responsibility but were to be forwarded to reach addressees not later than 0400Z the next day. Target Deviation Reports were forwarded via OPSCOMM to USM-704 (ACC) as action addressee and applicable aviation units and DSUs as information addressees.

Additionally, each aviation unit forwarded a daily report which was titled "Cherry Sheet Target Report". It listed all "cherry sheet" targets by target number, reference designator, and scheduled time which were not worked by the mission aircrew. Amplifying remarks were included to reflect target hearability when applicable; e.g., target could be heard on the acquisition antenna but was too weak to be worked on the dipole antenna. Reports were released at priority precedence as soon as possible following recovery of the last mission flown during the day by the aviation unit. The reports were forwarded via OPSCOMM to USM-704 (ACC) as action addressee and appropriate CMAs and DSUs as information addressees.[13]

The 6994th Scty Sq pointed out at the outset that the ARDF Tech Support Test incorporated a number of changes and refinements to current ARDF

[redacted]

[redacted]

procedures. To ensure that the test goals were realized, all units were directed to adhere strictly to the procedures outlined by NRV(C) and fully document all deviations noted or problems encountered.[14]

We observed that "cherry sheets" were developed from ground intercept continuity, and asserted that airborne versus ground intercept were not always in unison. While this subject had been discussed in the past, no firm reason for the differences had been determined except speculation, such as different signal environments and different intercept equipment configurations. We recommended that the CMAs develop "cherry sheets" primarily from airborne intercept continuity and use ground intercept continuity as a supplementary target source. This unit received the DIRNSA identification aid for the test on two occasions. The aid for the first week of the test was received prior to the implementation date, and the aid for the second week of the test was received via courier two days after the last effective date. We recommended that the DIRNSA identification aids be forwarded from the CMAs via OPSCOMM.[15]

In the 6994th Scty Sq's appraisal they stated that the first 20 days of the test had not resulted in the hoped-for improvement in providing accurate technical support/guidance to ARDF aircraft. There had been no increase in support from the CMAs and actually a significant decrease in ground-air tipoffs by the DSUs. Additionally, the test procedures appeared to result in mission degradation in both the USA-562 and USA-563 areas of responsibility. The only benefit which seemed to accrue was the opportunity for each unit to test the new NSA-generated identification aid (when it was received in time) containing all targets in a given area of concern, in alphabetical order, by transmitter callsign. Air Force intercept operators found this to be a beneficial technical aid for use against targets in South Vietnam.

The basic problem of lack of timely technical support from the CMAs and DSUs precluded reaping benefits from the test. ARDF units did not receive daily updated data or technical support for diverted missions. "Cherry sheet" technical support had remained constant with the same degree of accuracy being experienced as prior to the test. Generally throughout the 6994th Scty Sq complex only 2 - 10 percent of all "cherry sheet" entries proved valid within the limits of the test procedures.[16]

Ultimately the test was extended until 3 January 1971.[17] At that time this detachment compiled our final wrapup from "cherry sheet" target reports issued during the entire test from 24 October 1970 thru 3 January 1971. Due to some slight differences noted in report preparation, total targets, nil-heards, and targets unworkable due to aircraft being off-target were not absolutely correct but were as close as could be determined from our records. Our records disclosed the following:

a. Cherry sheets not received: 22 of 288.

b. Targets tasked: 3,193.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Nil-heard: 1, 937.

d. Unworkable due to aircraft off-target: 1,010.

e. On-sked and freq using correct calls: 70.

f. On-sked and freq using different calls: 5.

g. Off-sked but on-freq and using correct calls: 35.

h. Off-sked but on-freq and using different calls: 16.

i. Off-freq but on-sked using correct calls: 24.

j. Off-freq but on-sked and using different calls: 5.

k. Different sked and freq but using correct calls: 45.

l. Different sked and freq and using different calls: 46.

m. Three missions could not work targets or were cancelled.

Of all the targets tasked, this unit heard and attempted to work 7.7 percent of those listed; however, only 3.2 percent of those which could have been worked while the aircraft were over target were actually heard on frequency, on schedule, and using the callsigns listed on the "cherry sheets". Further, only 2.2 percent of all targets tasked fell into this category. Thus, in this unit's view, this represented the actual percentage of usability of the "cherry sheets".[18]

The support provided by our CMA (USM-7), is indicated (for phase II) as follows: (The first column is percent of the info on the TDL based on the CMA's ground-based intercept; the second column is the percent of accuracy of the same info based on the aviation unit findings; the last column is a compilation of both sources, thus giving a total accuracy of the info provided by our CMA.)

Station	Percent based on Dev Rpt	Percent based on TDL Rpt	Total
USM-7	21	3	24

Generally the accuracy of the technical data provided by the CMA during phase II was still low, but a definite improvement over phase I. The test also indicated that many targets did not operate on a reliable schedule basis and therefore were not predictable.[19]

Request for ARDF and Airborne Collection Support

[redacted] USM-704 (ACC) stated to our prime consumer, [redacted], that because the customer often critically requires immediate knowledge of enemy

[redacted]

[redacted]

disposition, ARDF special emphasis coverage had evolved as a means to expeditiously fulfill these requirements. They further stated that since aircrew members are required to pre-position the aircraft and make a dedicated effort to fix special emphasis targets, often at the expense of other priority targets, it was imperative that all concerned be aware of the necessity to maintain the integrity of this type of coverage. To ensure that special emphasis coverage was assigned discriminantly, the criteria for this type of coverage was outlined as follows:

a. Any target priority or non-priority, that posed an imminent threat to friendly forces.

b. Immediate knowledge of the target location was critical.

c. The target must be known to be active and identifiable in radio communications.

The terminology "Special Emphasis" was intended to mean increased emphasis and not special emphasis coverage. USM-704 (ACC) maintained that [redacted] best interest would be better served by raising the priority status of high interest targets and targets known to be, or suspected to become, tactically active.

The ARDF Special Emphasis Coverage Report was levied upon all Collection Management Authorities (CMAs) including ours, USM-7, by USM-704 in order to provide for more timely and systematic means of designating and deleting special emphasis target coverage assigned by J2 MACV, the CMA, and their supported customers. The dedicated use of extremely limited ARDF resources in attempts to fix special emphasis targets necessitated the J2 MACV policy to dictate that one reliable fix normally would satisfy the special emphasis coverage requirements.[20]

Post-Mission Plotting of Fixes

[redacted] Pac Scty Rgn queried the 6994th Scty Sq as well as this unit as to why 56 fixes were reported not passed during the period 10, 11, and 13 December 1970. They also wanted to know why 35 of the 56 fixes not passed were due to not being plotted until after landing.[21] In turn, the 6994th Scty Sq queried this unit as to why so many fixes were not being passed due to not being plotted.[22]

We stated that due to the current increase in the number of high-threat areas, free-fire zones, air strike limitations, and poor/deteriorating weather in the mission area, more of the navigator's time was consumed navigating around these obstacles and obtaining Doppler settings in order to know precisely where the aircraft was at all times; thus, they did not have as much time to make the necessary computations to derive fix coordinates on a timely basis.

[redacted]

[redacted]

This unit further stated that all traffic passed air/ground must be passed to NKP, since Udorn no longer had secure radio equipment, and frequently good communications could not be established until the mission aircraft were returning to base from the frag area. Often, all the traffic could not be passed before the aircraft landed. Also, our fix rate for the period 11 thru 13 December 1970 was higher than normal.[23]

Pac Scty Rgn responded that these factors were understood as inherent obstacles to timely plotting and that if the increase in these factors had complicated navigational procedures to the extent that post-mission plotting of fixes would be regularly required, then possibly a review of the situation would have to be conducted and remedial action taken.

Pac Scty Rgn also suggested that the attitude of the NKP navigators in relation to ARDF timeliness requirements could be affecting the situation. They were concerned that a natural tendency to delay the plotting of fixes had developed due to the absence of critical timeliness requirements. Pac Scty Rgn further stated that this was not an indictment against the NKP navigators' capabilities, but rather as a possible problem area that could be approached positively and quickly remedied with proper emphasis.[24]

The 6994th Scty Sq informed Pac Scty Rgn that the fixes involved were all from the missions conducted in the Barrel Roll area and that with the advent of the dry season the AAA threat had significantly increased in that area. As a result, the navigator must continuously monitor every aircraft location and still position the platform for the best fix acquisition. During the missions that experienced high productivity the navigators would work all targets and had to delay plotting in the interest of maintaining a safe aircraft position. It was only when all of these conditions existed that post-mission plotting was likely to result. Relatively inexperienced navigators working the ALR-34 system in a highly-productive environment was another contributing factor. So far as can be determined there was no attitude of complacency among the navigators which would degrade timeliness requirements. However, this was discussed with the 460th TRW and they assured us that timeliness requirements as well as all other factors would be stressed to all navigators.[25]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS

(July thru December 1970)

	July	August	September	October	November	December
Hours Fragged	620	620	600	620	600	620
Hours Flown	629.1	624.7	607.5	620	602.9	623.2
Targets Worked	1,061	795	901	1,083	980	948
Targets Fixed	923	731	808	941	852	804
Fixes Identified	532	420	407	662	526	446
Manual Morse and Radiotelephone Exploitable Messages	1,353	1,186	1,410	1,660	1,816	1,592
Minutes Manual Morse Copy	22,498	15,331	19,660	21,256	22,013	20,668
Minutes Radiotelephone Copy	9,280	8,819	7,487	7,871	7,025	6,203
Targets Copied	4,434	3,527	4,153	4,676	5,307	5,003

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

(13)

CHAPTER III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

(U) The following is an account of all pertinent activities within the Analysis and Reporting section of this detachment for the period of this report.

[redacted] 203X1MD Manning

During this period, our average 203X1MD PCS strength was five personnel, vice the eight authorized. Manning assistance was continually provided by the 6994th Scty Sq. It consisted of assigning three 203s for 30 days TDY. This procedure was less than desirable because after 10 - 14 days of training, we could actually use these personnel for only two weeks. Some extensions beyond 30 days were authorized in extreme cases. Eight additional personnel were programmed for PCS arrival in January 1971 which should alleviate the linguistic manning shortage.

Under the provisions of OPINS 3564 we are tasked with translation of intercepted messages and subsequent TACREP reporting. However, because of the acute manning shortage we were unable to meet this tasking requirement. Operational assistance was requested from Pac Scty Rgn and one 20371MD from that headquarters, TSgt John Riedel, was sent to this unit for five weeks. During this time he re-wrote the 203X1MD training and SEFE programs and implemented the translation program. However, shortly after his departure, our four most experienced linguists departed PCS and we anticipate that the translation/TACREP program will be re-implemented upon the arrival and subsequent training of the eight new 203 inputs programmed for January 1971.

Data Base for Callsign Identification

[redacted] In July, the identification data base was expanded to include NVA internal communications nets and implementation of continuous updates of fixed/rota and true basic files. Consequently, our identification rate increased ten percent during that month. In August one Q20270 arrived PCS. He was sent TDY to the 8th RRFS for familiarization of NVA cryptosystems, which enabled him to identify target transmitters to crypt system and case notation. As a result of the expansion and updating of the data base and the identification through cryptanalysis, our fix identification rate increased from 49 percent during the first half of the year to 59 percent during the last half and our SEATS identification rate increased from 57 percent to 64 percent.

Airborne Analysis

[redacted] During July and August, the Airborne Analyst program experienced

[redacted]

an acute manpower shortage. Consequently, we were unable to have an analyst aboard all missions. With the arrival of twelve 202XOs in early September, the airborne analysts were released from mandatory ground duties and returned to fulltime flying duties.

During August, the 460th TRW experienced a reduction in flight engineer authorizations. Change 5 to the T.O. governing EC-47 aircraft tasked the airborne analyst with certain flight engineer duties. Det 1, 360th TEWS personnel broached the issue of Det 3 A202s assuming these duties; we in turn queried the 6994th Scty Sq about the matter. The 6994th Scty refused to agree with the tasking, and the 460th TRW concurred with the squadron.

Detachment 3 is the only unit within the 6994th Scty Sq complex to man each mission with an A202XO, whose primary duties are coordination of Manual Morse intercept, identification of exploitable intercepted messages, and target identification. The effectiveness of the A202 program has been manifested by the increase to almost 100 percent of messages intercepted being exploitable. The Pac Scty Rgn Standardization/Evaluation Examiner, Captain Michael T. Christy, stated in his trip report that "It is recommended that the squadron initiate development of the program by drawing upon the A202 experience and expertise of Det 3."[27]

Air-Ground Communications

[redacted], in response to DIRNSA's inquiry, stated that crews attempted to pass all fixes air-to-ground during return from operating area to base. Because of terrain masking features, aircraft altitude, etc., it was only possible to transmit fixes during the last hour of the return flight to NKP. The practice was that USA-564 crews first attempted contact with USM-7 at Ramasun Station. If contact was successful, the fixes were transmitted until contact was lost. If contact was not established with USM-7, the crew then attempted to pass their traffic to USA-564. Contact with USM-7 was the exception rather than the rule and contact with USA-564 was often difficult to establish. The aircraft frequently landed at NKP before all fixes were transmitted.

They further stated that representatives from their office had discussed with U.S. Mission Laos and 7/13AF how they use ARDF data. ARDF data continued to be vital to their needs but [redacted] reported that they could not use this information by itself on a near real-time basis. TACREPs are used but reliance was placed chiefly on the SIGINT Locations Report (SLR) as the source of all ARDF information. It appeared to [redacted] that there was no valid requirement for passing fix information via air-ground communications to either USM-7 or USA-564. USM-7 could compile the SLR from USA-564 Recovery Reports and still meet customer requirements.

[redacted] recommended that USA-564 crews discontinue passing fixes and all other data except CRITIC information via air-ground communications until instructed otherwise. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The fixes would then be used to direct TACAIR strikes, artillery fire, etcetera. They were trying to institute such an operation prior to the next dry season.[28]

Pac Scty Rgn requested this unit's comments on [redacted] proposals.[29] This unit concurred with [redacted] recommendations. Our rationale was that we were fully sensitive to the criticality of rapidly passing fixes to the ground in Vietnam where an established capability exists, in the form of the DSUs, to trigger equally rapid reaction by a conventional military field force commander. The demonstrated success of this procedure in Vietnam left no doubt as to its efficacy there.

The situation at this unit, however, is entirely different for the fundamental reason that the war that we support is prosecuted differently. [redacted] receives USA-564-produced ARDF data via the SLRs as does 7/13AF, an arrangement apparently fully satisfactory to them. From the standpoint of satisfaction of consumer requirements, we could think of no reason to continue to operate the air-ground radios in support of ARDF. Further, elimination of this requirement would also be advantageous from the perspective of improved USAFSS management. This unit, despite the apparent lack of valid consumer need, has nevertheless passed fixes air-to-ground, just as though we were helping to fulfill Vietnam-like tactical requirements, which, to emphasize the point, did not exist here. It appeared Det 3 had to some extent, been forced into the "Vietnam Management Mold". In actual fact, we were simply passing fixes to ourselves, or on those rare occasions when we had contact, to USM-7. Even then, because of our long history of air-to-ground communications problems here, most of the fixes that were passed air-to-ground were transmitted during the last hour of each flight when the aircraft were in closer proximity to NKP (or Udorn).

The only purpose served by this procedure was not one of operational necessity, but rather convenience, since it afforded our ground analysts a headstart on preparation of post-mission recovery reports, or sometimes saved them work if exploitable messages could be passed from the aircraft to USM-7 who then had to "poke" up and transmit them via CRITICOMM.

We were convinced that it would not only be feasible, but even managerially desirable to stop what appeared to be a well-intentioned, but useless procedure, and in doing so, save ourselves, the "front-enders", as well as USM-7 some aggravation. Should [redacted] actually install, maintain, and operate suitable radio equipment at [redacted] or some other tactically significant locations in Laos with which our aircraft could reliably communicate via line-of-sight, our radio operation could be reinstituted.[30]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Pac Scty Rgn acknowledged that there was a continuing lack of timely utilization of the total Det 3 product. Solutions to the problem with [redacted] and the Air Force would continue to be pursued. Pending a satisfactory solution, and in support of the AF/USAFSS objective of maintaining a self-supporting operation, Det 3's complete support to maintaining successful A/G/A communications would continue.[31] USAFSS concurred with Pac Scty Rgn's air-ground communications concept. They stated that it was essential that Det 3's capabilities and the potential value of ARDF to [redacted] through timely receipt and use of product be emphasized.[32]

[redacted]

KY-8 Malfunctions

[redacted] During the period 26 September thru 5 October 1970 statistics show that of the 40 missions flown, 12 experienced KY-8 malfunctions for a 30 percent failure rate. The 6994th stated that this rate was unusually high and was causing some concern; they wanted to know if we were experiencing maintenance problems and if they could be of any assistance.[34]

This unit stated that we did not possess maintenance capabilities to support the KY-8s on the aircraft or in our air-ground radio van. We relied upon the 1987th Communications Squadron for crypto maintenance and the 56th Avionics Squadron for the aircraft KY-8s and associated equipment, and that we lacked the experience to monitor how well this support was actually rendered. This was not a new problem for this unit; rather it has plagued us since the inception of the UHF-KY-8 setup at this detachment. In order to alleviate the problem on the aircraft, this unit suggested that when rotating aircraft are deployed to this unit, their KY-8 gear be thoroughly checked prior to departure, and if a malfunction was discovered in equipment on the aircraft, it would be rectified before deployment to NKP.[35]

The 6994th Scty Sq stated they had contacted the 460th TRW and their local maintenance to thoroughly check the KY-8 equipment prior to departure for NKP.[36]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Upgrading Air-Ground Radios, Det 3

[redacted] This unit informed Pac Scty Rgn that discussions with the Programs Office, 1987th Communications Squadron, had disclosed that initiating action at this level to obtain an HF allocation (for use with the G-1186) or an FM capability (with the KY-8s) would be extremely slow. They advised that if normal base Communications-Electronics-Meteorological (CEM) Board and follow-on AFCS equipment programming procedures were adhered to, it would be from three to six months before we could actually operate. They recommended that the most expedient way to obtain the improvements would be to initiate them formally at Pac Scty Rgn level thru PACAF, PACCOMMAREA, and MACTHAI. Further, we informed Pac Scty Rgn that TFA does not control blocks of frequencies other than C-band, for relaying sensor data. TFA has no approval/disapproval authority for other frequencies; presumably acquisition of additional communications capability (assuming the equipment is located in our area) would be an independent action.[37]

Pac Scty Rgn requested this unit to advise them on what HF capabilities (transceivers) TFA had and if it was on the existing patch-board. They stated this information was for consideration of HF allocation for use with G-1186.[38] We informed Pac Scty Rgn that TFA had three KWM2A HF transceivers, two of which were allocated to 7AF and one to TFA. The radios were remoted from the TFA radio room and consequently not on the patch-board.[39]

Air-Ground-Air Radios

[redacted] Continuous transmission/reception problems were experienced on both the COMFY DISC and COMFY BRIDLE nets. Almost daily coordination with TFA Radio maintenance personnel and AFCS maintenance personnel temporarily alleviated the problem. Until September, 292X1 personnel operated the radios. During September four 202X0s arrived who were programmed for the G-1186/KY-8 function. The assignment of dedicated personnel was partially responsible for increasing the operational rate. On 23 December the G-1186 and KY-8s were moved into the TFA building, and at the time of installation they were re-engineered. Subsequent A/G/A contacts increased to more than the USAFSS objective of 80 percent operational capability.

On 25 September we asked for and obtained permission to use the COMFY DISC frequency (270.4) on the COMFY BRIDLE net during non-COMFY DISC operational hours. This contributed substantially to increased communications contacts on the COMFY BRIDLE net.

During the period 7 thru 16 November, a ten-mission test with the COMBAT APPLE ACRP in the Gulf of Tonkin (GOT) was conducted between the Combat Apple GOT aircraft and our ground station for the purpose of determining the primary ground station for the GOT ACRPs after the scheduled closure of the 6924th Scty Sq. Test results were negligible due to the distance involved.[40]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Personal interview with the Commander.
2. Personal interview with the Commander.
3. Personal interview with the Commander.

Chapter II

4. 6994 Scty Sq msg LOM 180305Z Jul 70 [redacted].
5. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DORT 200620Z Jul 70 [redacted].
6. Personal interview with the NCOIC of Maintenance.
7. Pac Scty Rgn msg LOSX 042200Z Sep 70 [redacted].
8. USAFSS msg LOXA 112045Z Sep 70 [redacted].
9. Pac Scty Rgn msg INX 140215Z Oct 70 [redacted].
10. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO/LO 150439Z Oct 70 [redacted].
11. Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO/LO 151100Z Oct 70 [redacted]
12. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO/LO 170756Z Oct 70 [redacted].
13. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] msg F461-6002-70 070133Z Oct 70 [redacted].
14. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 090234Z Oct 70 [redacted]
15. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DORTX 120320Z Nov 70 [redacted].
16. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 170130Z Nov 70 [redacted].
17. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] msg F461-0019-71 030255Z Jan 71 [redacted].
18. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 060410Z Jan 71 [redacted].
19. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] msg F461-0047-71 090906Z Jan 71 [redacted].
20. USM-704 msg IAPVACC 250700Z Nov 70 [redacted].
21. Pac Scty Rgn msg DOR 150226Z Dec 70 [redacted] and USAFSS msg DOR 142245Z Dec 70 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

22. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 150508Z Dec 70 [redacted].

23. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 151000Z Dec 70 [redacted].

24. Pac Scty Rgn msg DOR 162250Z Dec 70 [redacted].

25. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 191000Z Dec 70 [redacted].

Chapter III

26. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 280751Z Aug 70 [redacted].

27. Pac Scty Rgn Ltr, 11 Oct 70 [redacted].

28. [redacted] msg F47-1467-70, F47/D-464 070145Z Aug 70 [redacted].

29. Pac Scty Rgn msg DOR 080203Z Aug 70 [redacted].

30. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 090941Z Aug 70 [redacted].

31. Pac Scty Rgn msg DO 202055Z Aug 70 [redacted].

32. Pac Scty Rgn msg DO 031925Z Sep 70 [redacted].

33. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg CC 241018Z Sep 70 [redacted].

34. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 070947Z Oct 70 [redacted].

35. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 090930Z Oct 70 [redacted].

36. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 100810Z Oct 70 [redacted].

37. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg CC 140815Z Oct 70 [redacted].

38. Pac Scty Rgn msg DCP 040216Z Nov 70 [redacted].

39. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 040715Z Nov 70 [redacted].

40. Pac Scty Rgn msg DO/SIGO 222315Z Oct 70 [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted]

GLOSSARY

A

ACC	ARDF Coordination Center
ACRP	Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platform or Program
AF	Air Force
AF/USAFSS	Air Force/USAF Security Service
AFCS	Air Force Communications Service
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFSSO	Air Force Special Security Office
A/G/A	Air/Ground/Air
AGE	Air/Ground Equipment
AMSs	Airborne Mission Supervisors
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding

B

BCE	Base Civil Engineers

C

CAS	Controlled American Source
CINCPACAF	Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Air Force
CMA	Collection Management Authority
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications

D

Det	Detachment
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DM	Director of Materiel
DSU(s)	Direct Support Unit(s)

F

FAC	Forward Air Controller
FM	Frequency Modulation

G

G/A	Ground/Air

[redacted]

H

HF	High Frequency
Hq USAF	Headquarters United States Air Force

I

IBM	International Business Machine
IG	Inspector General
IRO	Instructor Radio Operator

M

MACT	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MCP	Military Construction Program
MHz	MegaHertz

N

NCOIC	Noncommissioned Officer In Charge
NKP	Nakhon Phanom
[redacted]	Not Later Than
NRV(C)	National Security Agency Pacific Representative [redacted]
NSA	National Security Agency
NVA	North Vietnamese Army

O

OPINS	Operating Instructions
OPSCOMM	Operations Communications

P

PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACCOMMAREA	Pacific Communications Area
Pac Scty Rgn	Pacific Security Region
PMEL	Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory

R

RECCE	Reconnaissance
RO	Radio Operator
RVN	Republic of Vietnam

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

S

SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATS	Southeast Asia Technical Summary
SEFE	Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SLP	SIGINT Location Reports
SOW	Special Operations Wing

T

TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACREP	Tactical Report
TDL	Target Data List
TDY	Temporary Duty
TFA	Task Force Alpha
TFA AFSSO	Task Force Alpha Air Force Special Security Office
TO	Technical Order
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

U

UHF	Ultra-High Frequency
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFSS	United States Air Force Security Service
USAFSSM	United States Air Force Security Service Manual

V

VHF	Very High Frequency
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX ONE

TO

DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

USS-D3

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

(Captain James R. Clapper Jr.)

Captain Clapper assumed command of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on 22 June 1970.

He was born on March 14, 1941, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He graduated from high school at the Nurnberg American High School, Nurnberg, Germany, in 1959. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Maryland in 1963 and a Master of Arts degree from St. Mary's University in 1970.

He was commissioned as a Distinguished Graduate in the Air Force ROTC program and was assigned initially to the USAFSS School at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. Following graduation from the Officer's Signal Intelligence Course in March 1964, he was assigned to the Air Force Special Communications Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. In December 1965, he was assigned to Headquarters 2nd Air Division (later designated 7th Air Force), Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN, as a Watch Officer and Desk Analyst in the Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Upon his return to the ConUS, he served as Aide To The Commander, USAFSS, for approximately three years.

Captain Clapper is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Class 67-C.

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

(Photo of Commander, Captain James R. Clapper, Jr., not available)

[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Doc 1. 6994 Scty Sq msg LOM 180305Z Jul 70 [redacted]
Doc 2. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DORT 200620Z Jul 70 [redacted]
Doc 3. Pac Scty Rgn msg LOSX 042200Z Sep 70 [redacted]
Doc 4. USAFSS msg LOXA 112045Z Sep 70 [redacted]
Doc 5. Pac Scty Rgn msg INX 140215Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 6. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO/LO 150439Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 7. Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO/LO 151100Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 8. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO/LO 170756Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 9. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] msg F461-6002-70 070133Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 10. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 090234Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 11. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DORTX 120320Z Nov 70 [redacted]
Doc 12. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 170130Z Nov 70 [redacted]
Doc 13. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] msg F461-0019-71 030255Z Jan 71 [redacted]
Doc 14. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 060410Z Jan 71 [redacted]
Doc 15. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] msg F461-0047-71 090906Z Jan 71 [redacted]
Doc 16. USM-704 msg IAPVACC 250700Z Nov 70 [redacted]
Doc 17. Pac Scty Rgn msg DOR 150226Z Dec 70 [redacted]
Doc 18. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 150508Z Dec 70 [redacted]
Doc 19. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 151000Z Dec 70 [redacted]
Doc 20. Pac Scty Rgn msg DOR 162250Z Dec 70 [redacted]
Doc 21. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 191000Z Dec 70 [redacted]
Doc 22. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 280715Z Aug 70 [redacted]
Doc 23. Pac Scty Rgn Ltr, 11 Oct 70 [redacted]
[redacted]
Doc 25. Pac Scty Rgn msg DOR 080203Z Aug 70 [redacted]
Doc 26. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 090941Z Aug 70 [redacted]
Doc 27. Pac Scty Rgn msg DO 202055Z Aug 70 [redacted]
Doc 28. Pac Scty Rgn msg DO 031925Z Sep 70 [redacted]
Doc 29. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg CC 241018Z Sep 70 [redacted]
Doc 30. 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 070947Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 31. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 090930Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 32. 6994 Scty Sq msg DORM 100810Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 33. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg CC 140815Z Oct 70 [redacted]
Doc 34. Pac Scty Rgn msg DCP 040216Z Nov 70 [redacted]
Doc 35. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg DO 040715Z Nov 70 [redacted]
Doc 36. Pac Scty Rgn msg DO/SIGO 222315Z Oct 70 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

NOTE: Many supporting documents are completely redacted. These have been removed to reduce file size.

[redacted]

1906

ORAB04
//ROUTINE//
SSN 479
1[illegible]Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS LOW
DET 3 6994SS LOW
ZEM

[redacted]

THE FOLLOWING MSG IS A RETRANSMISSION OF OUR LOW [illegible]Z JUN 78, FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE.
SUBJECT: ENGINEERING STUDY (U)
REFS: A. EUR 6994 E69-13
B. USAFSS DOY [illegible]Z APR 78
C. HQ ASD WPAFB 151542Z JUN 78
1. LT HONAKER, ENGINEER FROM HQ USAFSS (DOY) WILL VISIT OUR UNIT AND THE DETS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING AN ENGINEERING STUDY OF THE UHF/VHF/HF NOISE PROBLEM.
2. REQUEST YOU HAVE RO CONDUCT A NOISE TEST AS FOLLOWS TO DETERMINE IF UHF XR 2 TRANSCEIVER STILL CAUSES INTERFERENCE IN THE X, Y AND Z CONSOLES. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST ARE AIRCRAFT 044 (DET 1) AND 795 (DET 3):
A. TUNE TRANSCEIVER TO 319.2 MC AND GIVE A LONG COUNT TRANSMISSION AND RECORD INTERFERENCE NOTED ON X, Y AND Z CONSOLES.
B. TUNE TRANSCEIVER TO 399.4 MC AND GIVE A LONG COUNT TRANSMISSION AND RECORD INTERFERENCE NOTED ON X, Y AND Z CONSOLES.
C. SELECT TWO OTHER FREQUENCIES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TRANSCEIVER FREQUENCY RANGE AND THE LOW END OF THE FREQUENT RANGE AND CONDUCT TEST AS INDICATED IN A AND B.
3. SEND RESULTS TO THIS OFFICE ASAP AND ALSO RETAIN RESULTS AT YOUR DETACHMENT FOR BRIEFING OF LT HONAKER. GP-1
BT

[redacted]

DOT

[redacted]

4

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
			XX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

File: INT 1-2

DTG 200610Z

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ

[redacted]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

15 Nov 70

[redacted]

REF: YOUR LCM 240836Z JUN 70, ENGINEERING STUDY. NOISE TEST WAS CONDUCTED ON FREQS 234.9, 289.6, 301.7, 315.6 MHZ AND RESULTS PRESENTED TO LT HONAKER WERE:

ACFT 979: X POSITION EXPERIENCED INTERFERENCE ON THE 7 AND 8 BANDS.

ACFT 703: ALL HF RECEIVERS EXPERIENCED 3 - 5% NOISE ON ALL FREQS.

ACFT 925: BOTH Z POSITIONS HAD INTERFERENCE ON 315.6 MHZ. 422 SCOPE HAD HEAVY QRM FROM FREQ 289.6 MHZ.

ACFT 158: NO INTERFERENCE. GP-1

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: MSgt Overbay/jco — PHONE: 2020

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: [signature]

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CHAFFER JR., Captain, USAF

SECURITY [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

5

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ GPO 1969

An engineer will visit this unit on 12 July to conduct a survey on the interference problem we and the other units have experienced with the UHF-2 transceiver. The following test must be conducted on each aircraft prior to his arrival to determine if the interference problem still exists and to what degree. Procedures for conducting this test are:

Tune the UHF-2 transceiver to the folow listed frequencies. Give a long count on each frequency in the secure mode and indicate with a yes or no under the position designator which, if any, position experienced interference from the UHF-2 transceiver.

Recommend this test be ~~conducted as soon as airborne.~~

	X	Y	Z1	Z2
315.6	NO	NO	NO	NO
301.7				NO
289.6				NO
234.9				NO

REMARKS (if any of above is yes - specify equipment nomenclature)_____

AIRCRAFT TAIL NR 158

SRO BARNES

DATE

6

An engineer will visit this unit on 12 July to conduct a survey on the interference problem we and the other units have experienced with the UHF-2 transceiver. The following test must be conducted on each aircraft prior to his arrival to determine if the interference problem still exists and to what degree. Procedures for conducting this test are:

Tune the UHF-2 transceiver to the below listed frequencies. Give a long count on each frequency in the secure mode and indicate with a yes or no under the position designator which, if any, position experienced interference from the UHF-2 transceiver.

Recommend this test be conducted as soon as airborne.

	X	Y	Z1	Z2
315.6	NO	NO	YES	YES
301.7	NO	NO	NO	NO
289.6	YES	NO	NO	NO
234.9	NO	NO	NO	NO

REMARKS (if any of above is yes - specify equipment nomenclature) ON FREQ 315.6 Both pilots had moderate interference. ON FREQ 289.6 "X" Scope had very [illegible] when KY-5 was keyed!

AIRCRAFT TAIL NR 925

SRO WHITMAN

DATE 10 JUL [illegible]

6

10JULY197X

An engineer will visit this unit on 12 July to conduct a survey on the interference problem we and the other units have experienced with the UHF-2 transceiver. The following test must be conducted on each aircraft prior to his arrival to determine if the interference problem still exists and to what degree. Procedures for conducting this test are:

Tune the UHF-2 transceiver to the folow listed frequencies. Give a long count on each frequency in the secure mode and indicate with a yes or no under the position designator which, if any, position experienced interference from the UHF-2 transceiver.

Recommend this test be conducted as soon as airborne.

	X	Y	Z1	Z2
315.6	NOT AFFECTED	3-5%	NOT AFFECTED	2%
301.7	NOT AFFECTED	3-5%	NOT AFFECTED	2%
289.6	NOT AFFECTED	3-5%	NOT AFFECTED	2%
234.9	NOT AFFECTED	3-5%	NOT AFFECTED	2%

REMARKS (if any of above is yes - specify equipment nomenclature) Y CONSOLE-BOTH RCVR ONE/TWO-G133F HF RCVRS

Z2 CONSOLE-BOTH RCVR ONE/TWO-G133F HF RCVRS

Z1 CONSOLE-HAS BAD HF RCVR (G133F) HAS LOW LEVEL RF OUTPUT (EXTREMELY LOW) SO REMARK NOT AFFECTED COULD BE MISLEADING.

AIRCRAFT TAIL NR 703 TSGT R.L. SCHOFIELD

SRO Schofield

DATE 10 July 1970

63

An engineer will visit this unit on 12 July to conduct a survey on the interference problem we and the other units have experienced with the UHF-2 transceiver. The following test must be conducted on each aircraft prior to his arrival to determine if the interference problem still exists and to what degree. Procedures for conducting this test are:

Tune the UHF-2 transceiver to the ~~follow~~ listed frequencies. Give a long count on each frequency in the secure mode and indicate with a yes or no under the position designator which, if any, position experienced interference from the UHF-2 transceiver.

Recommend this test be conducted as soon as airborne.

	X	Y	Z1	Z2
315.6	YES (7+S Bands only)	NO	NO	NO
301.7	NO	NO	NO	NO
289.6	NO	NO	NO	NO
234.9	NO	NO	NO	NO

REMARKS (if any of above is yes - specify equipment nomenclature) X - ARC-34 (7+S Bands only)

AIRCRAFT TAIL NR 15979

SRO SSgt R L Sherwood

DATE 10 July 1976

6*

[redacted]

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGEFORM [redacted]

CLEAR TEXT
(Safeguard message in accordance with AFR 205-1.)

ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

MESSAGE NUMBER	DATE-TIME GROUP	TIME RECEIVED	TIME EDITED	CRYPTOCENTER (Installation etc.)
0451	042200Z	060550Z	060930Z	DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

FROM: PACSCTYRGN

TO: DET 2, 6994 SCTYSQ/LO

INFO 6994 SCTYSQ/LO

DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ/LOM

TDTG: 042046Z SEP 70

[redacted]

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OF ALR-38 SYSTEM AT NKP.

1. HQ USAF HAS DIRECTED AFLC TO PROCURE A PARTIAL SET OF ALR-38 AGE TO SUPPORT A SECOND OPERATING LOCATION FOR ALR-38 SYSTEM AT DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ, NKP, THAILAND. FOLLOWING ITEMS OF PECULAR AGE WILL BE PROCURED:
ONE EACH 6625-404-1599 EW-VHF RECEIVER TEST SET
ONE EACH 6625-404-4918 EW-PHASE MEASURE TEST SET
ONE EACH 6625-404-4921 EW-CAL GATE TEST SET
SIX EACH 6625-404-4923 EW-EXTENDER MODULES
TWO EACH 6625-404-4924 EW-INPUT SIMULATORS
TWO EACH 6625-762-6641 EW-DIAGNOSTIC TAPS

2. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING PECULIAR AGE ITEMS, AFLC WILL PROCURE ADDITIONAL SYSTEM SPARES AND SPARE PARTS FOR PECULIAR AGE ITEMS. AN ALR-38 BENCH MOCK-UP WILL NOT BE PROCURED FOR NKP. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT AT NKP WILL BE TO CHANGE-OUT AND REPAIR MODULES WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF AGE ITMES LISTED ABOVE AND RETURN REMAINING REPARALES TO DET 2, 6994SS FOR REPAIR OR NRTS TO SANDERS FOR DEPOT REPAIR. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHEN THE ADDRIONAL ALR-38 AGE ITEMS WILL BE DELIVERED TO NKP OR WHEN ALR-38 TRAINED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WILL BE AVAILABLE, BUT ASSUME TIME FRAME WILL BE SOMETIME IN 4Q71 OR 1Q72. SINCE THIS HQ HOLDS NO TECH DATA ON THE ALR-38 SYSTEM OR PECULIAR AGE, UR UNIT IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE FORGOING INFORMATION AND ADVISE IF YOU FORSEE ANY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN PERFORMING MAINTENANCE OF THE HF AND VHF MODULES IN THE ALR-38 SYSTEMS KEEPING IN MIND THAT AGE ITEM 48[illegible] OF THE ALR-38 AGE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AVAILABLE AT DET 3 IN TIME FRAME BEING DISCUSSED SINCE IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE TURNED OVER TO THE VNAF BY THAT TIME.SPECIFICALLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FOREGOING PECULIAR AGE ITEMS TOGETHER WITH THEIR COMMON AGE ITEMS AUTH FOR ALR-38 IN TA661, WHAT MAINTENANCE CANNOT BE PERFORMED AT NKP BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF A BENCH MOCK-UP? REQUEST UR COMMENTS BY 8 SEP OR SOONER IF POSSIBLE.
GP-1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES COPY 1 OF 5 COPIES

7

AF FORM 1013 MAR 57 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED. [redacted]

CON'O//

[redacted]

5 SEP 70 09 29Z

IN' 788

P 042246Z SEP 70
FM PACSCTYRON
TO DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ/LO
INFO 6994 SCTYSQ/LO
DET 3 6994 SCTYSQ/LOM
ZEM

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

LATE LOSX SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OF ALR-38 SYSTEM AT NKP.
1. HQ USAF HAS DIRECTED AFLC TO PROCURE A PARTIAL SET OF ALR-38 AGE TO SUPPORT A SECOND OPERATING LOCATION FOR ALR-38 SYSTEM AT DETACHMENT 3, 6994 SCTYSQ, NKP, THAILAND. FOLLOWING ITEMS OF PECULIAR AGE WILL BE PROCURED: ONE EACH 6625-474-1599EW-VHF RECEIVER TEST SET ONE EA6625-474-4928EW-PHASE MEASURE TEST SET 1EA6625-474-4921EW-CAL GATE TEST SET SIX EACH 6625-474-4923EW-EXTENDER MODULES 2EA6625-474-4902AEW-INPUT SIMULATORS 2EA6625-752-6641EW-DIAGNOSTIC TAPS TWO. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING PECULIAR AGE ITEMS, AFLC WILL PROCURE ADDITIONAL SYSTEM SPARES AND SPARE PARTS FOR PECULIAR AGE ITEMS. AN ALR-38 BENCH MOCK-UP WILL NOT REPEAT WILL NOT BE PROCURED FOR NKP. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT AT NKP WILL BE CHANGE-OUT AND REPLACE MODULES WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF AGE ITEMS LISTED ABOVE AND RETURN REMAINING REPARALES TO DET 2, 6994SS FOR REPAIR OR NRTS TO SANDERS FOR DEPOT REPAIR. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHEN THE ADDTIONAL ALR-38 AGE ITEMS WILL BE DELIVERED TO NKP OR WHEN ALR-38 TRAINED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WILL BE AVAILABLE, BUT ASSUME TIME FRAME WILL BE SOMETIME IN 1971 OR 1972. SINCE THIS HQ HOLDS NO TECH DATA ON THE ALR-38 SYSTEM OR PECULIAR AGE, UR UNIT IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE FOREGOING INFORMATION AND ADVISE IF YOU FORESEE ANY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN PERFORMING MAINTENANCE OF THE HOTEL FOXTROL AND VHF MODULES IN THE ALR-38 SYSTEMS, BEARING IN MIND THAT AGE ITEM 42 OF THE ALR-34 AGE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AVAILABLE AT DETACHMENT 3 IN THE TIME FRAME BEING DISCUSSED SINCE IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE TURNED OVER TO THE VNAF BY THAT TIME. SPECIFICALLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FOREGOING EPECULIAR AGE ITEMS TOGETHER WITH THE COMMON AGE ITEMS AUTH FOR ALR-38 IN TA661, WHAT MAINTENANCE CANNOT BE PERFORMED AT NKP BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF A BENCH MOCK-UP? REQUEST UR COMMENTS BY 8 SEPTEMBER OR SOONER IF POSSIBLE.
GP-1
350

[redacted]

NNNN

LOM

[redacted]

[redacted]

****
* [redacted]
****

****
* ROUTINE *
****

RTTSZYUW RUMTEJA3545 2542201-SSSS--RUMORBA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 112045Z SEP 70
FM USAFSS
TO RUHHPNA/PACSCTYRGN/LGSX/WHEELER AFB HAWAII
INFO RUSGSJA/6994SCTYSQ/LGS/TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM
RUMORBA/DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/LGS/NAKHON PHANOM AS THAILAND
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: DELIVERY OF ADDITIONAL (T LINE ITEMS) ALR-38 AGE. REF UR LGSX 110035Z SEP 70 (NOTAL 6994/DET 3 6994).
1. ESTIMATED DELIVERY NOW SCHEDULED FOR LATE DEC 70 OR EARLY JAN 71. UPON RECEIPT OF FIRM DELIVERY DATE, ALL CONCERNED WILL BE NOTIFIED.
2. ALR-38 TRAINING WILL BE INCLUDED IN AZK 30173-1 BEGINNING IN SIXTH WEEK OF COURSE. COURSE MATERIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE NLT 1 JAN 71. ANY SLIPPAGE IN EQUIPMENT DELIVERY (OCT 70) WILL CAUSE A CORRESPONDING SLIPPAGE IN TRAINING. CLASS ENTERING 2 DEC 70 WILL RECEIVE THIS TRAINING AND WILL GRADUATE
PAGE 2 RUMTEJA3545 S E C R E T
ON 2 MAR 71. THE NEXT CLASS ENTRY IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN 6 JAN 71 AND GRADUATE ON 6 APR 71. THIS WILL PROVIDE TRAINED PERSONNEL ON SITE IN LATE APR OR REALY MAY 71 DEPENDING ON LEAVES/SURVIVAL TRAINING. GP-1.
BT
#3545
NNNN
IN 00075/SEP255 /ACK

****
* [redacted] *

R

[redacted]

GRG TKS

-: 13 S
NAA092 ORA025
//PRIORITY//
SSN 419
P 152439Z
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/LO
DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/LO
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJ: ALR-38 BASING (U)
(1.) THE FOLLOWING MSG FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO/ACTION:
P 140215Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994 SS/DO/LO
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJECT: ALR-38 AIRCRAFT BASING
REF: AFSSO PACAF IN/DO 251925Z JUL 70
1. REF MSG, WHICH WAS RECAP OF CURRENT ACTIONS IN-PROCESS IMPACTING ON ARDF OPERATIONS IN SEA, OUTLINED DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT AND STATED RATIONALE SUPPORTING PACAF DESIRES TO SECURE BASING OF A PORTION OF THE ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT FLEET AT NKP.
2. PACAF PLANS (THROUGH 7AF) TO OBTAIN MACV CONCURRENCE IN A ONE FOR ONE TRADE-OF XF ALR-38 CONFIGURED EC-47PE AIRCRAFT FOR THE FIVE ALR-34 CONFIGURED EC-47N/P AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY STAGED FROM NKP. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH BOTH PACAF AND FOR LOGISTICS STAFFS, AIRCRAFT BASING PLANNING INCLUDES ASSUMPTION THAT ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE ON A TDY ROTATIONAL BASIS TO NKP AS DO THE PRESENT ALR-34 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT.
3. FOR PACSCTYRGN: FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO APPROACHING MACV: (A) EARLIEST DATE USAFSS CAN SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT TO NKP AND NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT THAT COULD BE SUPPORTED INITIALLY? (B) DESIRED PHASING OF DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT TO NKP? (C) ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR FIVE ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT AT NKP.
4. FOR 7AF: DISCUSSION WITH PACAF DM PERSONNEL INDICATES AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS INCURRED BY THE ABOVE DEPLOYMENT WILL BE MINOR. HOWEVER, REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE OF ANTICIPATED SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.GP-4.
UNQUOTE.
(2.) WE ANTICIPATE THAT OPERATORS FOR ALR-38'S FOR NKP WILL INITIALLY COME FROM DET 2, AND WILL ALSO TRAIN DET 3 OPERATORS. WHAT WOULD BE LENGTH OF TRAINING TO MAKE DET 3 SELF-SUFFICIENT? WOULD TDY DET 2 PERSONNEL CREATE A HEADROOM PROBLEM?
(3) IN OUR RESPONSE TO PACAF WE WILL A[redacted]
NAVIGATOR AND FRONT-END CREW.
(4.) WE DO NOT THINK THAT FIVE (5) ALR-38 A/C CAN BE A[redacted]
SUPPORTED AT NKP UNTIL MAY 71, WHEN ADDITIONAL TRAI[redacted]
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ARE ON-BOARD. PERHAPS ONE OR T[redacted]

9
10

TO 6994SS/DO/LO
ZEM
[redacted]
[redacted]
SUBJECT: ALR-38 AIRCRAFT BASING
REF: AFSSO PACAF IN/DO 251925Z JUL 70

1. REF MSG, WHICH WAS RECAP OF CURRENT ACTIONS IN-PROCESS IMPACTING ON ARDF OPERATIONS IN SEA, OUTLINED DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT AND STATED RATIONALE SUPPORTING PACAF DESIRES TO SECURE BASING OF A PORTION OF THE ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT FLEET AT NKP.

2. PACAF, PLANS (THROUGHT 7AF) TO OBTAIN MACV CONCURRENCE IN A ONE FOR ONE TRADE-OF XF ALR-38 CONFIGURED EC-47PE AIRCRAFT FOR THE FIVE ALR-3'7 CONFIGURED EC-47N/P AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY STAGED FROM NKP. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH BOTH PACAF AND PSR LOGISTICS STAFFS, AIRCRAFT BASING PLANNING INCLUDES ASSUMPTION THAT ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE ON A TDY ROTATIONAL BASIS TO NKP AS DO THE PRESENT ALR-34 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT.

3. FOR PACSCTYRON: FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS RQUIRED PRIOR TO APPROACHING MACV: (A) EARLIEST DATE USAFSS CAN SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT TO NKP AND NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT THAT COULD BE SUPPORTED INITIALLY? (B) DESIRED PHASING OF DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT TO NKP? (C) ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR FIVE ALR-38 CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT AT NKP.

4. FOR 7AF: DISCUSSION WITH PACAF ON PERSONNEL INDICATES AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS INCURRED BY THE ABOVE DEPLOYMENT WILL BE MINOR. HOWEVER, REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE OF ANTICIPATED SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.GP-4.

INROUTE.

(2.) WE ANTICIPATE THAT OPERATORS FOR ALR-38'S FOR NKP WILL INITIALLY COME FROM DET 2, AND WILL ALSO TRAIN DET 3 OPERATORS. WHAT WOULD BE LENGTH OF TRAINING TO MAKE DET 3 SELF-SUFFICIENT? WOULD TDY DET 2 PERSONNEL CREATE A HEADROOM PROBLEM?

(3) IN OUR RESPONSE TO PACAF WE WILL ADDRESS PROBLEM OF TRAINED NAVIGATOR AND FRONT-END CREW.

(4.) WE DO NOT THINK THAT FIVE (5) ALR-38 A/C CAN BE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED, AT NKP UNTIL MAY 71, WHEN ADDITIONAL TRAINED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ARE ON-BOARD. PERHAPS ONE OR TWO ALR-38 A/C COULD BE SUPPORTED AT THE PRESENT TIME ON A "BLACK BOX" EXCHANGE BASIS, BUT WOULD RATHER BEGIN WITH ONE ALR-38 IF THIS CONCEPT OF OPERATION IS ADOPTED ON AN INTERIM BASIS. RATIONALE IS TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME (90 DAYS) FOR DET 3 TO EVALUATE THIS TYPE OF AN OPERATION PRIOR TO COMMITTING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.

(5.) FOR YOUR INFO: USAFSS IS IN THE PROCESS OF PROCURING ADDITIONAL SPARES FOR

HIGH FAILURE ITEMS (ALR-38) TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT SPARES FTR BOTH LOCATIONS. THE REQUIREMENT FOR FLIGHTLINE AIRCONDITIONING AS STATED IN DET 2 LO 0?0?15Z SEPT 70 WILL BE INCLUDED IN OUR REPLY TO PACAF.

EASE PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS REGARDING PARAS 1, 3, 4 AND 5 OF PACSCTYRON PORTION OF ABOVE MSG TO US ASAP. WE NEED TO PROVIDE A CONSOLIDATED REPLY ON SAT 17 OCT.

543
7419

[redacted]

10c

[redacted]

NAA012
ZOB013
//PRIORITY//
[redacted]
SSN 0026
P 151900Z
FM DET 2, 6994 SCTYSQ
TO 6994 SCTY SQ
INFO DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ
ZEV
[redacted]
SUBJ: ALR-37 AIRCRAFT BASING (YOUR DO 150839Z OCT 70 REFERS).
YOU SUSPENSE PRECLUDED AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS, HOWEVER
THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED AS REQUESTED:
1. HOPERATORS: THIS DET CAN ADEQUATELY PROVIDE OPERATORS TO TRAIN
DET 3 PERSONNEL. WE FEEL THAT TWO IRO'S PER AIRCRAFT WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO CONDUCT A SHORT GROUND ORIENTATION COURSE AND FLY WITH
DET 3 OPERATORS. WE REQUIRED OUR SRO'S(AMS(S) TO FLY TEN MISSIONS
UNDER STAND/EVAL SUPERVISION BEFORE THEY FLEW THE ALR-37 ALONE. TEN
MISSIONS WERE MORE THAN ADEQUATE, THE "X" POSITION IS THE ONLY
SIGIFICANT EQUIPMENT THAT REQUIRES THOROUGH FAMILIARIZATION. NO
PROBLEMS IN OPERATOR TRAINING IS ANTICIPATED.
2. NAVIGATORS: WE FOUND THAT PROPER NAVIGATOR TRAINING WAS
EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS THE TRAINING OF RO'S AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.
BELIEVE THE SAME TRAINING CRITERIA WOULD APPLY TO NAVIGATORS AS
DOES THE RO'S.
3. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT: IS PACAF DV AWARE OF REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT
"O"HENGINES?
4. BRAVO MAINT SUPPORT OF ALR-34 AT THIS UNIT; WE HAVE LITTLE MAINT-
ENANCE CAPABILITY (T.O.S, AGE, EXPERIENCE, ETC) TO MAINTAIN ALR-34
SYSTEM, ADDITIONALLY, THIS WOULD BE A THIRD TYPE AIRCRAFT AT THIS BAS
AND WOULD UNDUELY COMPLICATE MAINTENANCE AND MISSION SCHEDULING. BASE
SUPPLY PRESENTLY HAS NO LEVELS FOR ALR-34 PARTS. WOULD MUCH PREFER
TO EXCHANGE ALR-37 AIRCRAFT FOR ALR-35HAIRCRAFT FROM NKP.
5. BRAVO MAINT MANNING: PARA 4 MENTIONS MAINT MANPOWER PROJECTED
FOR SEA BY 1 MAY 70. IF THESE ARE DET 2 PROJECTED INPUTS AND THEY
ARE DIVERTED, THE DEROS OF MOST OF THE DET 2 PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN
JULY-SEP 71AND THE ALR-37 MAINT AT DET 2 WILL THEN BE IN MUCH THE
SAME POSITION FOR EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL. AS IT IS NOW. AT PRESENT
THIS DET HAS THE ONLY ALR-37 EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS LIMITED AT BEEST.
TO FRAGMENT THIS EXPERIENCE WOULD FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE MAINT SITUATI
AT BOTH LOCATION. IN ADDITION, DET 3 WILL HAVE THE SAME PROBLEMS APRIL
-JUNE. HQ SR/OP SHOULD MONITOR THE STAGGERING OF DEROS FOR 37 TRAINED
MAINTENANCE MEN AT BOTH DETS TO PROVIDE OVERLAP AND CONTINUITY IN
EXPERIENCE.
6. BLACK BOX EXCHANGE: DO NOT CONCUR WITH SUPPORTING ONE AIRCRAFT
IN A "BLACK BOX" EXCHANGE. FROM PAST EXPERIENCE "ONE-OF-A-KIND" IS
DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IF ACC INSISTS ON TASKING 3 OF EVERY
7 DAYS. A LONG WOLF COULD PROBABLY NOT MANAGE MORE THAN 3 OF
7 DAYS TASKING BETWEEN BRAVO, AIRFRAME, HAND AVIONICS, ETC. MAINT UNITS
EVEN WITH COMPLETE SUPPORT IN BLACK BOXES, A SURPRISINGLY LARGE
NUMBER OF REPAIR ACTIONS ARE RELAYS, SWITCHES, [redacted]
TIME CONSUMING PART OF THE 37 SYSTEM MAINT IS E[redacted]RES
AND ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES. IT WOULD BE[redacted]

2. NAVIGATORS: WE FOUND THAT PROPER NAVIGATOR TRAINING WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS THE TRAINING OF RO'S AND MAINTENANCE P[redacted] BELIEVE THE SAME TRAINING CRITERIA WOULD APPLY TO NAVIGATOR[redacted] DOES THE RO'S.

3. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT: IS PACAF DM AWARE OF REQUIREMENTS TO S[redacted] "Q" ENGINES?

4. BRAVO MAINT SUPPORT OF ALR-34 AT THIS UNIT; WE HAVE LITTLE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY (T.O.S, AGE, EXPERIENCE, ETC) TO MAINTAIN ALR-34 SYSTEM. ADDITIONALLY, THIS WOULD BE A THIRD TYPE AIRCRAFT AT THIS BASE AND WOULD UNDUELY COMPLICATE MAINTENANCE AND MISSION SCHEDULING. BASE SUPPLY PRESENTLY HAS NO LEVELS FOR ALR-34 PARTS. WOULD MUCH PREFER TO EXCHANGE ALR-36 AIRCRAFT FOR ALR-35 AIRCRAFT FROM NKP.

5. BRAVO MAINT MANNING: PARA 4 MENTIONS MAINT MANPOWER PROJECTED FOR SEA BY 1 MAY 70. IF THESE ARE DET 2 PROJECTED INPUTS AND THEY ARE DIVERTED, THE DEROS OF MOST OF THE DET 2 PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN JULY-SEP 71 AND THE ALR-36 MAINT AT DET 2 WILL THEN BE IN MUCH THE SAME POSITION FOR EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL. AS IT IS NOW. AT PRESENT THIS DET HAS THE ONLY ALR-36 EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS LIMITED AT BEST. TO FRAGMENT THIS EXPERIENCE WOULD FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE MAINT SITUATION AT BOTH LOCATION. IN ADDITION, DET 3 WILL HAVE THE SAME PROBLEMS APRIL-JUNE. HQ SR/DP SHOULD MONITOR THE STAGGERING OF DEROS FOR 36 TRAINED MAINTENANCE MEN AT BOTH DETS TO PROVIDE OVERLAP AND CONTINUITY IN EXPERIENCE.

6. BLACK BOX EXCHANGE; DO NOT CONCUR WITH SUPPORTING ONE AIRCRAFT IN A "BLACK BOX" EXCHANGE. FROM PAST EXPERIENCE "O S-OF-A-KIND" IS DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IF ACC INSISTS ON TASKING 5 OF EVERY 7 DAYS. A LONE WOLF COULD PROBABLY NOT MANAGE MORE THAN 3 OF 7 DAYS TASKING BETWEEN BRAVO, AIRFRAME, HAND AVIONICS, ETC. MAINT UNITS. EVEN WITH COMPLETE SUPPORT IN BLACK BOXES, A SURPRISINGLY LARGE NUMBER OF REPAIR ACTIONS ARE RELAYS, HSWITCHES, AND CONNECTORS. THE TIME CONSUMING PART OF THE 36 SYSTEM MAINT IS EMPLOYING TEST PROCEDURES AND ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MEET AND SORT OF USEFUL FRAG WITHOUT A SPARE AIRCRAFT TO BACK UP MAINT DOWN TIME OR TO SERVE AS A SOURCE FOR CANNIBALIZED PARTS (AS WELL AS BLACK BOXES) WOULD HAVE TO COME THROUGH DANANG UNTIL THE ISSL LEVELS ARE REACHED AT NKP BASE SUPPLY.

7. FEEL THAT THIS MOVE SHOULD BE DONE WITH A PROGRAM ACTION DOCUMENT (PAD) AND A TARGET DATE SET FOR THE ENTIRE CHANGE OVER. THIS "TRIAL BASIS" EXCHANGE OF ONE OR TWO AIRCRAFT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VALUABLE MISSIONS, MORESO THAT WAITING UNTIL ALL SUPPORT FACILITIES, MANPOWER AND SUPPLY ASSETS ARE IN PLACE AT DET 3. RATIONALE AS FOLLOWS: THE MOVEMENT OF ACFT TO NKP WOULD SAVE ABOUT ONE HOUR "ON TARGET" TIME PER MISSION. HOWEVER, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE (PARA 5), TWO ACFT WOULD HAVE TO BE DETACHED FROM DET 2 IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE SAME RATE OF TASKING AT DET 3. THIS WILL RESULT IN TWO ACFT BEING USED TO GAIN ONE HOUR ON ONE MISSION.

8. IN CONCLUSION, THE TRAINING OF OPERATORS AND NAVIGATORS SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM.
HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT THE MAINT AND SUPPLY SUPPORT WILL PRESE PROBLEMS THAT WILL POSSIBLY OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED.

800
0026

[redacted]

NNNN

112

[redacted]

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
			X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: PRIORITY

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

FILE: ARDF ACFT

DTG 17/0756Z OCT 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994TH SCTY SQ

TO: 6994TH SCTY SQDN/DO/LO

INFO: DET 2, 6994TH SCTY SQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

SUBJ ALR-38 AIRCRAFT BASING (U)

REF'S (A) 6994TH DO/LO 140215Z OCT 70

(B) DET 2, 6994TH DO/LO 151100Z OCT 70

1. DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL THIS STATION DISCLOSES GENERAL CONCURRENCE WITH DET 2'S MSG. (REF B).

2. WOULD SUGGEST THAT ALR-38 QUALIFIED TRAINING TEAM FROM GOODFELLOW BE DISPATCHED FOR A 30 DAY TDY RATHER THAN BURDENING DET 2 WITH AN ADDITIONAL TRAINING BURDEN FOR OUR MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS.

DATE	TIME
17	
MONTH	**YEAR**
OCT	70
PAGE NO.	**NO. OF PAGES**
1	1

DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT CLAPPER/TSGT MC DOWELL

PHONE

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT USAF

[redacted]

12

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 53 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ZNY VVNSH
R 090234 Z
FM 6994 TH SCTY SQ [redacted]
TO DET 1 6994 TH SCTY SQ/
DET 2 6994 TH SCTY SQ/DO
DET 3 6994 TH SCTY SQ/DO
INFO PACSCTYRGM/DOR
ZEM
[redacted]

SUBJ: ARDF TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEST (U
REF: NSAREPV(O F-461-6002-78, 272133Z OCT 78
1. SUBJECT TEST OUTLINED IN REF INCORPORATES A NUMBER OF CHANGES AND REFINEMENTS TO CURRENT ARDF PROCEDURES. TO ENSURE THE TEST GOALS ARE REALIZED, ALL UNITS MUST ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN THE REF TEST PLAN, AND FULLY DOCUMENT ALL DEVIATIONS NOTED OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.
2. UPON RECEIPT OF REF ALL UNITS WILL:
A. PREPARE LOCAL IMPLIMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS ASSIGNING SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES TO APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS FOR:
(1) THOROUGH FAMILIARIZATION OF ALL SUPERVISORS, ANALYSTS AND AIRCREW PERSONNEL IN THE OVERALL TEST PROCEDURES AND THE PART EACH WILL PERFORM TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASKS.
(2) REVIEW OF ALL INCOMING CONMSGS, IDENT AIDS, CHERRY SHEETS, ADDITIONS, DELETIONS OR CORRECTIONS FOR CONSISTENCY WITH ASSIGNED TASKS FOR EACH POSITION AND FOR COMPLETENESS OF DATA NECESSARY FOR AIRCREW TO PERFORM THE ASSIGNED TASKING. COMPARE AND RECORD ALL VARIANCES BETWEEN PRIORITIES ASSIGNED IN CONMSG AND MACV PRIORITY LISTING.
(3) PREMISSION AIRCREW BRIEFINGS OUTLINING CONMSG ASSIGNED TASKS FOR EACH POSITION, TYPE OF COVER ASSIGNED AND SPECIFIC TASKS TO BE PERFORMED BY EACH MEMBER OF CREW. MANDATORY USE OF CHERRY SHEET FOR POSITIONING ACFT FOR EACH SCHEDULE LISTED AND FIXING OF SPECIFIC TGTS AS TASKED. USE OF MODIFIED VACUUM CLEANER OPERATION BETWEEN SCHEDS. CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN ACFT AND DSU REQUIRED. USE OF IDENT AID PROVIDED BY NSA. SUPPLEMENTAL DATA PROVIDED BY ANALYSTS TO AUGMENT TECH SUPPORT DATA PROVIDED BY CMA. VARIANCES TO BE NOTED BY AIRCREW AND TO BE REPORTED DURING DEBRIEFING.
(4) DEBRIEFING OF AIRCREW TO OBTAIN COMPLETE DATA REQUIRED BY TEST. VARIATIONS ENCOUNTERED DURING MISSION IN ALL AREAS WHICH AFFECTED PERFORMANCE OF CREW FOR INCLUSION IN DAILY CHERRY SHEET TARGET REPORT. A TEMPORARY LOG FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL BE PREPARED BY EACH AIRCREW TO COMPILE THE DATA REQUIRED FOR EACH LISTED SCHEDULE, DSU TIPOFF IAW TEST PROCEDURES, HOW TGT WAS IDENTIFIED, AND ALL OTHER DATA WHICH WILL ASSIST ACC IN IMPRVING THE TASKING AND TECH SUPPORT PROVIDED. SPECIFIC AIRCREW COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CHERRY SHEET AND TECH SUPPORT DATA IN ACCOMPLISHING THE CONMSG ASSIGNED TASKS ARE ESSENTIAL.
(5) COMPILATION OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO TEST PROCEDURAU INCLUDING SUPPORTING DATA. COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH CMA TO RESOLVE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH LATE OR INCONSISTENT CONMSGS OR LACK OF TECH SUPPORT TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED TASKS. RECORD ALL CONTACTS WITH CMAS AND RESULTS OBTAINED.
B. ALL RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO TEST PROCEDURES WILL BE FORWARDED TO 6994 TH SCTY SQ (DORM) FOR REVIEW, CONSOLIDATION AND FORWARDING TO USM 704 TWENTY DAYS AFTER START OF T[redacted]
ATIONS DIRECTLY TO NSAREPV(O.
C. BRIEFING TEAM WILL VISIT CMA/AVN UNITS AS INDICATED IN REF TO EXPLAIN PROCEDURES AND PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO REQUIRED. HOWEVER PREPARATIONS FOR PERFORMA[redacted]NED IN REF SHOULD BE INITIATED ASAP

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

INIT

TYPE MSG | BOOK | MULTI | SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 120320Z NOV 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

SUBJECT: ARDF TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEST (U)

REF: UR DORM 100300Z NOV 70

1. CHERRY SHEETS ARE DEVELOPED FROM GROUND INTERCEPT CONTINUITY. AIRBORNE VS GROUND INTERCEPT IS NOT ALWAYS IN UNISON, AND HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF MUCH DISCUSSION IN THE PAST. HOWEVER, NO FIRM REASON(S) FOR THE DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED, ONLY SPECULATIVE REASONS SUCH AS DIFFERENT SIGNAL ENVIRONMENT AND DIFFERENT INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION.

2. MANY TARGETS, SOME OF WHICH WERE MACV PRIORITIES, WERE NOT FIXED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ON THE CHERRY SHEETS BUT WERE ACTIVE DURING THE SIX-MINUTE SKED PERIODS. FURTHERMORE, CHERRY SHEETS FOR SOME 612A MISSIONS WERE NOT RECEIVED FROM THE CHA.

3. WE RECOMMEND THE CHA'S DEVELOP CHERRY SHEETS PRIMARILY FROM AIRBORNE INTERCEPT CONTINUITY AND USE GROUND INTERCEPT CONTINUITY AS A SUPPLEMENTARY TARGET SOURCE.

DATE	TIME
12	
MONTH	YEAR
NOV	1970
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: MSGT HART/lah

PHONE: 2020

[redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Arthur C. Hart

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., CAPTAIN, USAF
Commander

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

15

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1969-332-157

ABBREVIATED J[illegible]IT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTI[illegible]ATION SHEET [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE		lah	2020
INFO			

4. WE HAVE RECEIVED DIRNSA IDENT AID FOR THIS TEST ON TWO OCCASSIONS: THE AID FOR THE FIRST WEEK OF THE TEST WAS RECEIVED PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION DATE, AND THE IDENT AID FOR THE SECOND WEEK OF THE TEST WAS RECEIVED TWO DAYS AFTER THE LAST EFFECTIVE DATE, VIA COURIER. RECOMMAND DIRNSA IDENT AIDS BE FORWARDED FROM THE CMA'S VIA OPS COMM.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

15 2

[illegible]PLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

ZKZK RR ARL DE
R 121152Z
FM 6994 SCTY SO
TO NSAPAC REP VIETNAM [redacted]
INFO USAFSS (AC/CC)
PACSCTYRGN (CO)
USA-562
USA-567
USA-554
USM-
321055ZYPU
USA-526
USA-734 (ACC)
USF-734
ZEN/USA-561
ZEA
[redacted]
USF-794 (HOLD AND PASS TO DIRNSA)
SUBJ: ARSF TECH SUPPORT TEST (90-DAY STATUS REPORT)/[redacted].
REF: NRV MSG F461-5082-70, 071152Z OCT 70.
THIS MSG IN THREE PARTS.
PART ONE: OVERVIEW.
THE FIRST 90 DAY PERIOD OF THE 180 DAY ARSF TECH SUPPORT TEST HAS NO RESULTED IN THE HOPED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN PROVIDING ACCURATE TECHNICAL SUPPORT/GUIDANCE TO ARSF AIRCRAFT. THERE HAS BEEN NO INCREASE IN SUPPORT FROM CMA'S AND ACTUALLY A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN G/A TIP OFF BY DSUS. ADDITIONALLY TEST PROCEDURES HAVE RESULTED IN MISSION DEGRADATION IN BOTH USA-562 AND USA-563 AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE ONE PRIMARY BENEFIT HAS BEEN THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EACH UNIT TO TEST THE NEW NSA GENERATED IDENT AID, WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED IN TIME, CONTAINING ALL TARGETS IN A GIVEN AREA OF CONCERN IN ALPHABETIC ORDER BY TRANSMITTER. AIR FORCE RADIO OPERATORS HAVE FOUND THIS TO BE AN EXTREMELY BENEFICIAL TECH AID FOR USE AGAINST NVTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SPECIFIED IN PART TWO AND THREE BELOW. THE BASIC PROBLEM OF LACK OF TIMELY TECHNICAL SUPPORT FROM CMA'S AND DSUS PRECLUDES REAPING BENEFITS FROM THIS TEST. WE ARE NOT RECEIVING DAILY UPDATED DATA OF TECH SUPPORT FOR DIVERTED MSNS. CHERRY SHEET TECH SUPPORT WAS REMAINED CONSTANT WITH THE SAME AMOUNT OF ACCURACY BEING EXPERIENCED AS PRIOR TO THE TEST. GENERALLY THROUGHOUT THE 6994 SS COMPLEX ONLY 2-10 PERCENT OF ALL CHERRY SHEET ENTRIES PROVED VALID WITHIN LIMITS OF THE TEST PROCEDURES. THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT INCREASE IN NUMBER OF TARGETS WORKED IN USA-561 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY DURING THIS PERIOD (FIX, CUT, LOP) WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF VACUUM CLEANER CONCEPT IN CONJUNCTION WITH NSA IDENT AID.
PART TWO: PROBLEMS.
1. THE TEST LOAN STIPULATION THAT ONLY PRIORITY ONE OR SPECIAL EMPHASIS TARGETS THAT HAVE FIRM SCHEDULES BE INCLUDED ON CHERRY SHEETS HAS RESULTED IN SOME AREAS NOT HAVING ANY TECH DATA.
2. AVIATION UNITS DID NOT RECEIVE THE NSA IDENT GUIDE IN A TIMELY MANNER ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. MAIN REASON WAS VOLUME OF DATA WHICH REQUIRED REPOKING, SINCE IT WAS RECEIVED AT CMA VIA NSA HIGH SPEED CIRCUIT.
3. DUAL TARGETS SCHEDULED IN WIDELY DISPERSED AREAS ALL ASSIGNED A PRIORITY ONE, CAUSING CONFLICT IN TARGET WORKUP.
4. MANY TARGETS, SOME OF WHICH WERE LISTED AS HIGH PRIORITIES, WERE NOT FIXED BECAUSE THEY WERE ACTIVE DURING THE PERIOD DEDICATED TO SEARCH FOR ALLEGEDLY FIRM SPECIAL EMPHASIS AND PRIORITY ONE TARGETS. THIS PROCEDURE A[redacted]TE AT USA-562.
5. CHERRY SHEET INACCURACIES [redacted] CALLSIGNS EXTRACTED FROM SOI DATA, INCORRECT FREQUENCIES AND TIMES.

TARGETS. THIS PROCEDURE [redacted] DECREASE IN FIX RATE AT USA-553.

2. CHERRY SHEET [redacted] ING CALLSIGNS EXTRACTED FROM SORTDATA, INCORRECT FREQUENCIES AND TIMES, AND OUT OF AREA TARGETS LISTED. ADDITIONALLY MANY TGT LOCATIONS WERE LISTED INCORRECTLY WHICH LED TO BAD ACFT POSITIONING. GENERALLY THOSE TARGETS WHICH WERE FIXED WERE WORKED ON A DIFFERENT FREQUENCY THAN THAT PROJECTED.

PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. THE THREE MINUTE PRIOR TO AND AFTER SCHEDULE SEARCH HAS PROVED TOO RESTRICTIVE. RECOMMEND THAT THIS BE EXPANDED TO FIVE MINUTES AND ALLOW OPERATORS TO WORK OTHER TARGETS THUS AVOIDING MISSION DEGRADATION. THE AIR FORCE ARDF SYSTEMS ARE CAPABILE OF SIMULTANEOUS MULTI-TARGET WORKING AND FIXING, AND CAN WORK OTHER TARGETS WHILE STILL SEARCHING FOR DESIGNATED SPECIAL EMPHASIS OR PRIORITY ONE SCHEDULES.

2. WHEN NO TECH DATA IS AVAILABLE ON PRIORITY ONE OR SPECIAL EMPHASIS TARGETS IN A GIVEN AREA, SELECTED PRIORITY TWO TGT DATA SHOULD BE PROVIDED. [redacted]

3. THE FORMAT OF THE USA [redacted] ELIMINATE EXCESSIVE USE OF PERIODS. RECOMMEND AS MINIMUM THAT ROVER/ITR CALLSIGNS BE SEPARATED WITH A VIRGULE (/). ALSO, IF POSSIBLE, AN USA IDENT GUIDE IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER BY ROVER WOULD BE BENEFICIAL. THE USA IDENT GUIDE HAS PROVED ITS VALUE TO THE AIRBORNE OPERATOR AND STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IT BE RETAINED AS [illegible] SUPPORT AID WITH RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS. IT SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN ONE COMPLETE PACKAGE INSTEAD OF PIECEMEAL AS IS PRESENTLY BEING DONE, AND BE AVAILABLE TO THE AVIATION UNIT NO LATER THAN 48 HOURS PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF EACH TASKING CYCLE.

4. IN VIEW OF LO VALIDITY OF CURRENT TEST CHERRY SHEETS (TWO TO TEN PERCENT) BELIEVE CIA/S SHOULD STRESS DAY-TO-DAY CONTINUITIES OBTAINED FROM AIRBORNE INTERCEPT TO ENHANCE RELIABILITY. UTILIZING GROUND INTERCEPT CONTINUITIES IS A SUPPLEMENTARY TARGET SOURCE. USA-561 HAS CONDUCTED A VERY LIMITED TEST PROVIDING OPERATORS WITH CHERRY SHEETS UPDATED FROM PREVIOUS DAY'S INTERCEPT AND THIS RESULTED IN THREE TARGETS BEING FIXED AND IDENTIFIED ON 11 NOV WHICH WERE NOT FIXED FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. ALTHOUGH THE POTENTIAL IS THERE, BELIEVE SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE IN TIME AND MANPOWER WILL BE REQUIRED OF THE CIA TO PROVIDE THIS TYPE SUPPORT.

5. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE OVERALL CONCEPT AND PROCEDURES PROMULGATED BY THE ORIGINAL TEST PLANS ARE NOT BEING FULLY ADHERED TO BY OUR TECHNICAL SUPPORT AUTHORITIES (CIA'S, DSU'S) AND IN VIEW OF THE ASM DEGRADATION BEING EXPERIENCED AT USA-562 AND USA-563, RECOMMEND THAT THE TEST BE TERMINATED OR SUSPENDED UNTIL REVISED PLAN CAN BE IMPLEMENTED AND COMPLETE EVALUATION OF THIS PHASE ACCOMPLISHED.

[redacted]

16²

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

SINGLE

XXX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

[redacted]

DTG 18 1140Z DEC 70

FROM: USA-564

TO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM [redacted]

[redacted]

ARDF TECH SUPPORT TEST PHASE TWO

REUR F461-6635-70; DTG: 171017Z DEC 70

THIS STN NOT IN RECEIPT OF UR F461-6515-70; DTG 040030Z DEC. PLEASE FORWARD.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
18	
MONTH	YEAR
DEC	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
01	01

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

K KESSLER/DORTX

PHONE 2080

[redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

LEWIS DELAURA, CAPT., USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 06 0410 Z H JAN 71

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ

TO: 6994 SCTYSQ/DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

SUBJECT: ARDF CHERRY SHEET TEST (FINAL WRAPUP)

1. INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM CHERRY SHEET TARGET REPORTS ISSUED BY THIS UNIT DURING THE 72-DAY TEST FROM 24 OCT 70 THRU 03 JAN 71. DUE TO SOME SLIGHT DIFFERENCES NOTED IN REPORT PREPARATION, TOTAL TARGETS, NIL HEARDS, AND TARGETS UNWORKABLE DUE TO ACFT BEING OFF TARGET, ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY CORRECT BUT ARE AS CLOSE AS CAN BE DETERMINED FROM THIS UNIT'S RECORDS.

2. DURING THE TEST THIS UNIT RECEIVED AND ACCOMPLISHED THE FOLWG:

A. CHERRY SHEETS NOT RECEIVED: 22 OF 288.

B. TARGETS TASKED: 3,193.

C. NIL HEARD: 1,937.

D. UNWORKABLE DUE TO ACFT OFF TARGET: [redacted] 1,010.

E. ON SKED AND FREQ USING CORRECT CALLS: 70.

F. ON SKED AND FREQ USING DIFFERENT CALLS: 05.

G. OFF SKED BUT ON FREQ AND USING CORRECT CALLS: 35.

H. OFF SKED BUT ON FREQ AND USING DIFFERENT CALLS: 16.

DATE	TIME
06	
MONTH: JAN	YEAR: 71
PAGE NO.: 1	NO. OF PAGES: 3

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt . DeLaura

PHONE: 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis DeLaura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DELAURA, Captain, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY [redacted]

GRADING INSTRUCTIONS

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DD FORM 1 NOV 68 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1969-357-681

ABBREVIATED INT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE INFO	Capt. DeLaura	Capt. DeLaura	2020

XX I. OFF FREQ BUT ON SKED USING CORRECT CALLS: 24.

J. OFF FREQ BUT ON SKED AND USING DIFFERENT CALLS: 05.

K. DIFFERENT SKED AND FREQ BUT USING CORRECT CALLS: 45.

L. DIFFERENT SKED AND FREQ AND USING DIFFERENT CALLS: 46.

M. THREE MISSIONS COULD NOT WORK TARGETS OR WERE CANCELLED.

3. OF TOTAL TARGETS TASKED WE DID HEAR AND ATTEMPT TO WORK 07.7 PERCENT OF THOSE LISTED. HOWEVER, ONLY 03.2 PERCENT OF THOSE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN WORKED WHILE ACFT WAS OVER TARGET WERE ACTUALLY HEARD ON FREQ, ON SKED, AND USING THE CALLSIGNS LISTED ON THE CHERRY SHEETS. FURTHER, ONLY 02.2 PERCENT OF ALL TARGETS TASKED FELL INTO THIS CATEGORY; THUS, IN OUR VIEW, THIS REPRESENTS THE ACTUAL PERCENTAGE USABILITY OF THE CHERRY SHEETS.

4. DURING THE TEST, THIS UNIT FLEW ONLY MISSIONS FRAGGED FOR ABSOLUTE COVERAGE; TWO AREAS WERE RECTANGULAR FRAG AREAS, ONE WAS A LINE FRAG, AND TWO WERE POINT FRAGS. ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE AREAS WAS COVERED BY THE LINE FRAG WHICH DID NOT ALLOW ENOUGH DEVIATION FROM FLIGHT ROUTE TO OBTAIN FRAGGED PRIORITY TARGETS WHICH HAD EXCESSIVE STANDOFF RANGES. THE ARDF SYSTEM USED BY THIS UNIT (AN/ALR-34) ALLOWS WORKING OF MULTIPLE TARGETS AND PRESENTS A CONSTANT SCOPE DISPLAY OF ALL WORKABLE SIGNALS WITHIN THE SELECTED TWO MHZ BAND. BECAUSE OF THIS AND OTHER FACTORS WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE ONLY REQUIREMENT FOR WORKING SELECTIVE TARGETS IS TO HAVE ACCURATE SCHEDULES

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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DD FORM 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE INFO	Capt. DeLaura	Capt. DeLaura	2020

AND GAILSIONS SO THE ACFT CAN BE PROPERLY POSITIONED WHEN THE TARGET STATIONS BECOME ACTIVE AND CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS THE DESIRED STATION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DURING THIS TEST ONLY 104 TARGETS WERE OBSERVED ACTIVE ON SCHEDULES LISTED ON THE CHERRY SHEETS AND FIVE OF THESE WERE USING [redacted]

OVERALL PRIORITY FIX RATE DID NOT DECREASE DRASTICALLY IS BECAUSE THE PRIORITY TARGETS IN BARREL ROLL ARE CONCENTRATED IN CERTAIN AREAS AND ACFT POSITIONING WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED BY THE TEST."

5. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE AND THESE STATISTICS WE FEEL THAT THE BEST POSSIBLE WORKING AID FOR OBTAINING PRIORITY ARDF TARGETS WOULD BE A MACHINE-GENERATED PROJECTION OF AN ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF ALL PRIORITY CALLS. THIS LIST WOULD ALSO INCLUDE ALL LAST KNOWN LOCATIONS AND THE MACV ASSIGNED PRIORITY. THE CMA COULD ADVISE ON A DAILY BASIS WHICH PRIORITIES THEY DESIRE FIXES ON. THE AVH UNIT WOULD THEN ADD SCHEDULES DERIVED FROM LOCAL RECORDS BASED ON THEIR LATEST TECH DATA AND PREPARE THE MISSION PROFILES ACCORDINGLY. SEVERAL LOCAL TESTS HAVE REVEALED THAT SCHEDULES DERIVED FROM OUR INTERCEPT BASED ON THE MOST CURRENT DATA AVAILABLE ARE MORE ACCURATE THAN THOSE FROM OTHER SOURCES.

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DD FORM 173-1 PREVIOUS EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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NNNNZCZCA162ZCZCZAAS32CZCDAA353SVC924
RR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0032 3490239
ZNY MMMSH
R 150225Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/DOR
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DOR
ZEM/

15 DEC 1970 05 47

[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJ: FIXES NOT PASSED AT NKP[redacted].
REF USAFSS DOR MSG 142245Z DEC 70, SAME SUBJ.
1. REF IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO/ACTION:
QUOTE:
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOR

[redacted]

SUBJECT: FIXES NOT PASSED AT NKP [redacted]
1. HAVE NOTICED RECENT DECLINE IN FIX PASS RATE AT NKP. DURMIS FOR 10, 11, AND 13 DEC 70, REPORTED 56 FIXES NOT PASSED A/G: 35 OF THE 56 NOT PASSED WERE DUE TO NOT BEING PLOTTED UNTIL AFTER LANDING. ALTHOUGH UNIT DID NOT AMPLIFY ON SUBJECT, IT APPEARS THIS OCCURRED ON MISSION 615S EACH TIME.
2. WOULD LIKE SUBJECT EXPANDED UPON PRIOR TO SKED WEEKLY DURMIS BRIEFING ON 22 DEC 70.
UNQUOTE.
2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE RESPONSE TO THIS HQ NLT 18 DEC 70.
162
0032

DO

[redacted]

NNNN

[redacted]

[redacted]

21

[redacted]

160

0610Z

NAA005
QRA005
//ROUTINE//
SSN 447
150500Z
FM 699455
TO DET 3 699455 DORM
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJ: FIXES NOT PASSED
REF A: UR DURMIS 11120
B. URMDURMIS 13120
IN REF A, 14 FIXES WERE REPORTED AS NOT BEING PASSED DUE TO NOT BEING PLOTTED (NP). ALL 14 FIXES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ON MSN 615BA. IN REF B, AGAIN THE CODE NP WAS USED FOR NOT PASSING 16 FIXES AND THEY TOO APPEAR TO HAVE ALL OCCURED ON THE SAME MISSION (615BA). QUERY IF YOU CAN LEND ANY FURTHER EXPLAIATION AS TO WHY SO MANY FIXES WERE NOT PLOTTED.
125
SSN 447
150500Z

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

22

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECU [redacted] SINGLE

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

INT 1-90

DTG 15/1000Z DEC 70

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN/DOR

6994 SCTY SQ/DO/DORM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

[redacted]

SUBJ: FIXES NOT PASSED A/G AT NKP [redacted]

REFS: A. PSR DOR 150226Z DEC 70

PRECEDENCE

B. 6994 DOR1 150506Z DEC 70

1. THE RECENT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF HIGH THREAT AREAS, FREE FIRE ARTILLERY ZONES, AIR STRIKE LIMITATIONS, AND POOR/DETERIORATING WEATHER IN THE MISSION FRAG AREA NECESSITATES THAT MORE OF THE NAVIGATORS TIME MUST BE TAKEN UP NAVIGATING AROUND THESE OBSTACLES AND OBTAINING DOPPLER SETTINGS IN ORDER TO KNOW PRECISELY WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IS AT ALL [redacted] HAVE THE TIME TO MAKE THE NECESSARY COMPUTATIONS TO DERRIVE FIX COORDINATES ON A TIMELY BASIS.

SUBJ: FIXES NOT PASSED A/G AT NKP [redacted]

2. ALL TRAFFIC PASSED AIR/GROUND MUST NOW BE PASSED TO NKP, AS UDORN NO LONGER HAS SECURE RADIO EQUIPMENT, AND FREQUENTLY GOOD COMMS CAN NOT BE ESTABLISHED UNTIL THE MISSION AIRCRAFT ARE RETURNING TO BASE FROM THE FRAG AREA. OFTEN ALL TRAFFIC CAN NOT BE PASSED BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT LEAVES THE 615R IS LOCATED IN [redacted] THIS TIME

1. THE RECENT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF HIGH THREAT AREAS, FREE FIRE ARTILLERY ZONES, AIR STRIKE LIMITATIONS, AND POOR/DETERIORATING WEATHER IN THE MISSION FRAG AREA NECESSITATES THAT MORE OF THE NAVIGATORS TIME MUST BE TAKEN UP NAVIGATING AROUND THESE OBSTACLES AND OBTAINING DOPPLER SETTINGS IN ORDER TO KNOW PRECISELY WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IS AT ALL [redacted] HAVE THE TIME TO MAKE THE NECESSARY COMPUTATIONS TO DERRIVE FIX COORDINATES ON A TIMELY BASIS.

2. ALL TRAFFIC PASSED AIR/GROUND MUST NOW BE PASSED TO NKP, AS UDORN NO LONGER HAS SECURE RADIO EQUIPMENT, AND FREQUENTLY GOOD COMMS CAN NOT BE ESTABLISHED UNTIL THE MISSION AIRCRAFT ARE RETURNING TO BASE FROM THE FRAG AREA. OFTEN ALL TRAFFIC CAN NOT BE PASSED BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT LEAVES THE 615R IS LOCATED IN [redacted] THIS TIME

DATE 15 | TIME

MONTH DEC | YEAR 70

PAGE NO. 1 | NO. OF PAGES 3

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: [redacted] Kessler, De Laura

PHONE 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

Laura De Laura

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

Lewis De Laura, Capt, USAF

Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASS [redacted]

REL [redacted]

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DD FORM 1 NOV 63 EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 MAY BE USED. U.S. Government Printing Office: 1969 332-167

NO LONGER HAS SECURE RADIO EQUIPMENT, AND FREQUENTLY GOOD COMMS CAN NOT BE ESTABLISHED UNTIL THE MISSION AIRCRAFT ARE RETURNING TO BASE FROM THE FRAG AREA. OFTEN ALL TRAFFIC CAN NOT BE PASSED BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT LEAVES THE 615R IS LOCATED IN [redacted] THIS TIME

ABBREVIATED [illegible]NT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CODE/CLASSIFICATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
[redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY:	DRAFTED BY:	
ACTION ROUTINE	Capt De Laura	Ribbs, Kessler	2020
INFO			

AND OUR FIX RATE FOR THE CITED PERIOD WAS HIGHER THAN NORMAL.

ABBREVIATED [illegible]NT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CODE/CLASSIFICATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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SECURITY C[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
[redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 [illegible]



[redacted]

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[redacted]

R 191000Z
FM 6994SCTYSO
TO PACSCTYRGN-DO
INFO ZEN/DET 6994SCTYSO-DO
[redacted]

SUBJECT: POST-MISSION PLOTTING OF FIXES.
REFERENCE: A. DET 3 151800Z DEC 72
B. PSR DOR 150226Z DEC 72
C. PSR DO 162250Z DEC 72
1. FOLLOWING INFO IS PROVIDED AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCE C AND EXPANDS ON INFO CONTAINED IN REFERENCE B.
2. THE FIXES INVOLVED ARE ALL FROM THE MISSIONS CONDUCTED IN THE BARREL ROLL AREA. WITH THE ADVENT OF THE DRY SEASON THE AAA THREAT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED IN THAT AREA. AS A RESULT THE NAVIGATOR MUST CONTINUOUSLY MONITOR EVERY ACFT MANEUVER AND STILL POSITION THE PLATFORM FOR THE BEST FIX ACQUISITION. DURING MISSIONS THAT EXPERIENCE HIGH PRODUCTIVITY THE NAV WILL [redacted] AND MUST DELAY PLOTTING IN THE INTEREST OF MAINTAINING A SAFE ACFT POSITION. IT IS ONLY WHEN ALL THESE CONDITIONS EXIST THAT POST-MISSIONS PLOTTING IS LIKELY TO RESULT. THE "RECENT INCREASE" OCCURRED ON MSNS THAT EXPERIENCED ALL THESE VARIABLES. A RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED NAV WORKING THE ALR-34 IN A HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT IS ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACOTR. INSTANCES OF POST-MSN PLOTTING HAVE OCCURRED BEFORE AND THIS "RECENT INCREAST" DOES NOT INDICATE A REQUIREMENT FOR POST-NAV PLOTTING ON A REGULA BASIS. DET 3 AND THIS HQ ARE CLOSELY MONITORING THIS NAVE PLOT AND IF A TURE TREND DEVELOPES APPROPRIATE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.
3. SO FAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED THERE IS NO COMPLACENT NAVIGATORS ATTITUDE THAT WOULD DEGRADE TIMELINESS RQMTS. HOWEVER WE HAVE DISCUSSED THAT POSS WITH 460 TRW AND HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT TIMELINESS RQMTS AS WELL AS ALL OTHER FACTORS WILL BE STRESSED TO ALL NAVIGATORS. DO NOT BELIEVE THE OPERATION WITH [redacted] WILL ADVERSLY AFFECTED BY INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS SINCE HIGH THREAT AREA ARE NOT AS NUMBEROUS IN THE PAKSE REGION.
4. IF A GRND STA IS LOCATED IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE BARREL ROLL AREA OR IN ANY AREA WHERE ALL THE FACTORS OULINED IN PARA 2 ARE LIKELY TOEXIST SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEN INSTANCES OF POST MSN PLOTTING WOULD OCCUR MORE FREQUENTLY. DO NOT BELIEVE NAV ATTITUDE IS SIGNIFICANT FACTOR, HOWEVER EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON ALL ASPECTS OF THIS SUBJECT WITH ALL CREWMEMBERS. ACFT OPERATING RESTRICTIONS ARE A MAJOR OBSTACLE AS STATED IN PARA 2. HOWEVER RESTRICTIONS BECOME SIGNIFICANT ONLY WHEN THE OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED EXIST.
5. WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND INITIATE REMIDIAL ACTION AS RQD.

[redacted]

[redacted]

25

[redacted]

File: INT 1-2
ARDF, AEFT

****
* ROUTINE *
****

AUG 28 10 17 '70

DET 3
6994

RTTCZYUW RUSQSNA0673 2400815-CCCC--RUMOREA.
ZNY CCCCC
R 280751Z AUG 70
FM 6994SCTYSQ/TSN AB RVN
TO RUMLJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ/PHU CAT AB RVN
RUMUJBA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/DANANG AB RVN
RUMOREA/DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
INFO RUHHWHA/PACSCTYRGN/DOR/[redacted]
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: ASSUMPTION OF FLIGHT MECHANIC DUTIES (U)
1. CHANGE FIVE TO THE T.O. GOVERNING THE OPERATION OF EC-47 TASKS THE AIRBOURNE ANALYST WITH CERTAIN FUNCTIONS FORMERLY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE FLIGHT MECHANIC.
2. THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE 460TH TRW AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT CHANGE FIVE WAS NOT SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AND THAT CHANGE SIX, CURRENTLY IN PUBLICATION, TASKS THE NAVIGATOR WITH SUCH FUNCTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, 460TH TRW LOCAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 55-47 OVERRIDES CHANGE FIVE AND TASKS THE NAVIGATOR WITH THE FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE FLIGHT MECHANIC.
3. FOR DET 1: YOUR UO 2406342 AUG 70 (TOTAL) REFERS.
GP-4

FM 6994SCTYSQ/TSN AB RVN
TO RUMLJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ/PHU CAT AB RVN
BT
0673
NNNN
IH 00320/AUG240 /ACK

S/c "3"

SUBJ: ASSUMPTION OF FLIGHT MECHANIC DUTIES (U)
1. CHANGE FIVE TO THE T.O. GOVERNING THE OPERATION OF EC-47 TASKS

WITH SUCH FUNCTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, 460TH TRW LOCAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 55-47 OVERRIDES CHANGE FIVE AND TASKS THE NAVIGATOR WITH

IH 00320/AUG240 /ACK

[redacted]

D 36

[redacted]

FROM: PacSctyRgn (DOAT) 11 October 1970

SUBJECT: Standardization/Evaluation Trip Report

TO: 6994 Scty Sq (CC/DO)

1. The PacSctyRgn ARDF Stan/Eval Team visited the 6994 Scty Sq and detachments during the period 1-11 Oct 70. The team consisted of Capt Michael T. Christy, TSgt James R. Lino, and TSgt Jack F. Bourdo. Team members flew a total of ten operational missions to evaluate airborne procedures and also reviewed ground operational functions bearing directly upon airborne mission accomplishment.

2. The attached report [redacted]'s specific findings with regard to the major area [redacted] this visit. Minor discrepancies and problem areas were discussed in detail with each operations officer.

3. In addition to specific recommendations indicated in the attachments, the following items were noted:

a. CONUS training for airborne personnel being assigned to the 6994 Scty Sq complex was discussed in detail with Unit Training and SERE sections. Several excellent suggestions for improving CONUS training were fully documented and will be consolidated by PacSctyRgn for submission to Hq USAFSS.

b. At each unit visited, the continuing problem of unavailable or unusable cheater sheets was surfaced. New cheater sheet concepts and procedures are being experimented with under NRV [redacted] direction at this time. However, the 6994 should re-emphasize the necessity for the local analysis sections to supplement tech data received from the CMA's. Lack of sufficient 202 resources and a complete data base is recognized. However, with the resources available and daily up-date of the local data base, each unit can very definitely provide its airborne platforms with more current tech data. The primary goal of the local analysis section should be to augment CMA tech data and provide the most current and accurate technical support possible to the airborne operator. PacSctyRgn and the 6994 Scty Sq will review and evaluate AFSC distribution throughout the squadron to determine if additional 202 manning can be made available.

c. An effective and progressive A202 program is needed at the 6994 Scty Sq (DOXT) and Det 2. As indicated in the attached reports, the airborne analyst can contribute significantly to mission accomplishment and crew coordination. It is recommended that the squadron initiate development of the program by drawing upon the A202 experience and expertise at Det 3. PacSctyRgn will request a waiver for physically qualified 202's currently assigned to the 6994th to be placed on flying status.

[redacted]

27'

evaluate AFSC distribution throughout the squadron to determine if additional 202 manning can be made available.

[redacted]

d. Det 3 is tasked by OPINS 3664 with decrypting all exploitable readable messages using crypt systems held. This task is not being performed due to a lack of sufficient A203XD personnel. It is recommended that the 6994 Scty Sq request MACV authorization for selective A203XD manning of Zulu aircraft launching out of Tan Son Nhut. Enemy voice activity in SEA areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 20 could be adequately covered by selective concentration on areas of high voice activity combined with periodic and systematic sampling of other areas. This action would free A203's assigned to Tan Son Nhut for TDY to Det 3 to supplement voice processing. If possible, Det 3 should be manned with 12 A203XD personnel.

e. It is suggested that the squadron consider the possibility of initiating an operator exchange program among its detachments and local operations.

4. This initial stan/eval visit was considered extremely beneficial to all units concerned and to the Pac Scty Rgn (USCT) staff. The team wishes to express its appreciation for the cooperation and courtesies extended during the visit and the [illegible] request MACV authorization for selective

MICHAEL T. CHRISTY, Captain, USAF
Chief, Standardization/Evaluation Team

4 Atchs
1. Report of Visit, 6994 Scty Sq (USCT)(SMVCCO)
2. Report of Visit, Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq (SMVCCO)
3. Report of Visit, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq (SMVCCO)
4. Report of Visit, Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq (SMVCCO)

Lan. voice processing. If possible, Det 3 should be manned with 12 A203XD personnel.

all units concerned and to the Pac Scty Rgn (USCT) staff. The team wishes to express its appreciation for the cooperation and courtesies

MICHAEL T. CHRISTY, Captain, USAF
Chief, Standardization/Evaluation Team

4 Atchs
1. Report of Visit, 6994 Scty

[redacted]

4. Report of Visit, Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq (SMVCCO)

[redacted]

27

[redacted]

REPORT OF VISIT, DET 3, 6994th Scty Sq

1. Name of Examiner: Capt Michael M. Christy.

2. Dates: 2-7 Oct 70.

3. Missions Flown: 615D, 03 Oct, AMS - SSgt Butler

615A, 05 Oct, AMS - SSgt Fuller

4. Areas Inspected: [redacted]

a. Airborne Prerequisite Training:

(1) Det 3 has established an effective and aggressive training program for newly assigned A292 and A202 personnel. Ground training in these AFSC's includes extensive orientation in emergency procedures and personal equipment [redacted] local operational procedures and requirements prior to assignment to an IRO. Incoming A203 personnel receive emergency procedures and personal equipment training, but are not given specialized operational orientation. This situation exists because of the lack of a qualified A203 supervisor. The unit has identified the problem and has taken action to assign the most qualified 203 on station to the training program. Additionally, TDY assistance from Pac Scty Rgn is expected in late October.

615A, 05 Oct, AMS - SSgt Fuller

(2) The unit has an excellent IRO program. IRO selection and criteria are demanding and stringently applied. A general IRO checklist is being developed to assist in the standardization of IRO procedures and to ensure that all critical areas are being covered during the training cycle. The unit will incorporate this checklist into the IRO program. (1) Det 3 has established an effective and aggressive training program for newly assigned A292 and A202 personnel. Ground training in

b. Airborne Operations:

(1) The Det CIF file is current and applicable. All CIF's are authoritative and signed only by the commander or operations officer. A card file system is utilized to ensure that all crewmembers have reviewed the CIF book. [redacted] has taken action to assign the most qualified 203 on station to the training program.

(2) The unit's checklists are current and in good condition. The checklists contain essential mission information required by the Airborne Operators. Emergency destruction procedures are current. A checklist for the airborne analyst is being developed and will be put into use ASAP.

[redacted]

authoritative and signed only by the commander or operations officer. A card file system is utilized to ensure that all crewmembers have re-

[redacted]

(3) Flying hour totals are posted on a large wall chart which is utilized daily by scheduling personnel to ensure overall flying hour balance and prevent violation of flying time restrictions. The unit has revised its procedures for logging and monitoring flying time to ensure compliance with paragraph 10-7, AFM 60-1.

c. Mission Procedures:

(1) The pre-mission briefings at Det 3 operations area were conducted efficiently. Current Tech Data and specific priority targets and their location were adequately briefed. Position assignments were given. Personal equipment, survival kits and sanitized wallets were closely checked by the briefer. The briefings are normally recorded, but the unit's tape recorder was being repaired during the period of this visit.

(2) The classified material inventory and the KYK-3 key settings were closely checked prior to departure from operations. The AMS assigns specific emergency destruction duties to each crewmember during the pre-mission briefing.

(3) Weather, emergency procedures and escape and evasion information was adequately covered at the combined crew briefing the Det 3 mission briefings presented to the combined crew were extremely professional and effective. True unit designators of priority targets and their suspected locations were covered along with a recommendation for general aircraft positioning within the frag area. Although the AMS was not being identified by name, the unit immediately revised procedures to ensure that the AMS is specifically identified at the combined crew briefing.

(4) The unit's adherence to established pre-mission procedures was generally excellent. Personal equipment and parachutes checked by each crewmember. Exterior and interior pre-flight procedures were accomplished as required.

(5) Mission procedures observed at Det 3 were outstanding. The airborne operators utilize available Tech Data to the fullest extent. The Y and Z operators were observed searching for and copying targets throughout the mission, from take-off to landing. The airborne analyst is responsible for compiling all logs and performing all A/G communications, thereby freeing the collection and ARDF operators for maximum utilization of their positions. The airborne analyst provided extremely effective and timely intercept guidance to all operators and smoothly coordinated the ARDF and collection mission. Each intercepted callsign and/or message is immediately checked by the analyst who quickly makes the "drop or copy" decision and coordinates with the X operator for possible ARDF and with the navigator for aircraft positioning. Crew coordination between the USAFSS and front-end crew and among the USAFSS crew was outstanding.

[redacted]

[redacted]

274

[redacted]

During a peak activity period on the 03 Oct 615D mission, the airborne analyst and AVS smoothly coordinated the copy of exploitable traffic by all three collection operators (Y, Z1, and Z2) while the X operator simultaneously obtained fixes on two targets and hand-copied two exploitable messages. A/G communications procedures were excellent when contact with the ground station could be established. The analyst continously attempted to establish A/G contact.

(6) It was noted that not all aircraft have a sufficiently long patch cord at the analyst position to enable him to remain on interphone as he performs his duties in the rear of the aircraft. This harpers mission coordination an[redacted]irable aircrew safety situation. It is recommended t[redacted] intensify its efforts to have patch cords of sufficient length installed on all Zulu configured aircraft.

(7) The aircraft security check was thoroughly performed. Post mission maintenance and operations debriefings were conducted efficiently. The Classified material inventory was checked closely.

c. Stan/Eval Section.

(1) The Det 3 Stan/Eval section is efficiently organized and managed. The section has established procedures to closely monitor aircrew proficiency through frequent check flights, review of trends noted on USAFSS Form 74 and IRO student evaluations, frequent review and up-date of checklists and utilization of the quarterly Stan/Eval review panel.

(2) Stan/Eval tests are taken from a master question file. Enough tests are available in all AFSC's to ensure that the same examination is not given to a particular individual on a subsequent SEFE check. Records are kept showing which test each individual has been given. Tests are stored in a safe and access is strictly controlled.

(3) The SEFE section maintains a status board which clearly indicates when each crewmember is due a certifying check ride as well as the category status of all crewmembers. The unit SEFE's give check rides as non-primary crewmembers in all cases.

(4) 846's are properly maintained. All SEFE's and AVS's are designated on orders and IRO's are designated by letter.

(5) The unit has assigned an A202 to the SEFE section and a comprehensive A202 SEFE program has been developed. An A203 is assigned to the SEFE section and procedures and concepts are being further refined. The A203 SEFE program is hampered by the absence of a highly qualified A203 supervisor. (see para 4a(1) above).

[redacted]

[redacted]

275

[redacted]

ZCZCDVA523
ZZ YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ [redacted]
ZNY UUUUU
[redacted]
FM [redacted]
TO USA-56[redacted]
INFO USA-561
[redacted]
DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR.
SUBJ: AIS [redacted] COMMS.
REF [redacted] F47-1467-7[redacted] 273145Z AUG.
REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON ABOVE UPDATE PUBLISHED TO HQS USAFSS
AND THIS [redacted]S.
[redacted]
[redacted]

TO USA-56[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON [redacted]
AND THIS [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TYPE NOTE

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

INT 1-1

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: USAFSS/DOR

PACSCTECH/DOR

[redacted]

SUBJECT: AIR GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

REFS: A. [redacted] F47-1467-70 MSG 070145Z AUG 70

B. PSR DOR 080203Z AUG 70

C. DET 3 CC 0712382 AUG 70 (NOTAL)

1. WE CONCUR WITH RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN REF A. FOLLOWING ADDNL COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED. WE ARE FULLY SENSITIVE TO THE CRITICALITY OF RAPIDLY PASSING FIXES TO THE GROUND IN VIETNAM, WHERE AN ESTABLISHED CAPABILITY EXISTS -- IN THE FORM OF THE DET'S -- TO TRIGGER EQUALLY [redacted] REACTION BY A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FIELD FORCE COMMANDER. THE DEMONSTRATED SUCCESS OF THIS PROCEDURE IN VIETNAM LEAVES NO DOUBT AS TO ITS EFFICACY THERE.

2. THE SITUATION AT THIS UNIT, HOWEVER, IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL REASON THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WAR THAT WE SUPPORT

DATE 69 | TIME [redacted]

PAGE NO. 1 | NO. OF PAGES 4

DRAFTER | TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt. Clapper | PHONE 2020

RELEASER | SIGNATURE: James R. Clapper | JAMES R. CLAPPER, USAF, Captain, USAF, Commander

SECURITY [redacted]

DD.[redacted]

TO ITS EFFICACY THERE.

ABBREVIATED [illegible]NT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION [illegible]	Capt. Clapper	Capt. C[illegible]
INFO		

IS PROSECUTED IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. [redacted]

[redacted]

3. THE SAME IS TRUE IN THE CASE OF TASK FORCE ALPHA. WHAT ARDF-RELATED INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS THEY HAVE (RECEIPT OF FIXES BY 0100 LOCAL THE FOLLO DAY) ARE ALSO BEING FULFILLED BY USM-7 AND USM-308 WHO TRANSMITS THEIR SLR'S TO US VIA OPSCOM AND THEN WE PASS THEM TO TFA (DIAI), AN ARRANGEMENT THEY TOO APPARENTLY FIND MORE THAN SATISFACTORY. EVEN THEN, TFA HAS VIRTUALLY NO [redacted], SO IS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED WITH USM-308'S SIR COVERING STEEL TIGER. WE DO NOT PASS ANY DATA TO TFA ON A TIMELY BASIS; THE KY-8 LINK BETWEEN OUR A/G/A RADIO VAN AND DIAI IS NOT OPERATIONAL, NOR HAS IT EVER REALLY BEEN SO FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS INTENDED. IN FACT, TFA HAD INITIATED ACTION WITH 7AF (WHO IN TURN RELUCTANTLY CONCURRED) TO OFFICIALLY DELETE THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE KY-8 LINK BETWEEN DET 3 AND DIAI. (WE UNDERSTAND HOWEVER, THAT GEN GORMAN HAS DEMURRED ON THIS REQUEST.) ARDF-DERIVED INFORMATION IS USED BY TFA ONLY ON A LONGER-TERM BASIS, I.E., A BUILDUP OF FIXES IN AN AREA FOR

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	[redacted]	02	4	DO 090941 Z AUG70	[redacted]
SECURITY CL					

DD . FORM 173-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SEC [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY	Capt. Clapper	Capt. Clapper	2020
INFO			

PERIODS OF A WEEK OR MONTH MAY TRIGGER MORE FINITE RECONNAISSANCE BY OTHER (VISUAL MEANS) -- AND THIS, IN TURN, COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO PLANTING OF SENSORS. THE PROCESS -- AS FAR AS THIS UNIT IS CONCERNED -- IS NOT TIME-SENSITIVE.

THUS, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SATISFACTION OF CONSUMER REQUIREMENTS, WE CAN THINK OF NO REASON TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE AIR/GROUND RADIOS IN SUPPORT OF ARDF. FURTHER, ELIMINATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD ALSO BE ADVANTAGEOUS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF IMPROVED USAFSS MANAGEMENT. THIS UNIT -- DESPITE THE APPARENT LACK OF VALID CONSUMER NEED -- HAS NEVERTHELESS HAD TO PASS FIXES AIR-TO-GROUND, JUST AS THOUGH WE WERE HELPING TO FULFILL VIETNAM-LIKE TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS, WHICH, TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT, DO NOT EXIST HERE. IT WOULD APPEAR DET 3 HAS TO SOME EXTENT BEEN FORCED INTO THE "VIETNAM MANAGEMENT MOLD." IN ACTUAL FACT, WE SIMPLY PASS FIXES TO OURSELVES, OR ON THOSE RARE OCCASIONS WHEN WE HAVE CONTACT, TO USM-7, NEITHER OF WHOM DOES ANYTHING WITH THEM UNTIL AFTER THE ACFT RECOVER AND POST-MISSION REPORTS ARE ISSUED ANYWAY. EVEN THEN, BECAUSE OF OUR LONG HISTORY OF AIR-TO-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS HERE, MOST OF THE FIXES THAT ARE PASSED AIR-TO-GROUND ARE TRANSMITTED DURING THE LAST HOUR OF EACH FLIGHT WHEN THE ACFT ARE IN CLOSER PROXIMITY TO NKP (OR UDORN).

THE ONLY PURPOSE NOW SERVED BY THIS PROCEDURE IS NOT ONE OF

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	[redacted]		4	DO 090941 Z AUG 70	
SECURITY CLASS				[redacted]	

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 NOV 63 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED [illegible]NT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONT[illegible]ATION SHEET

[redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	DATE
ACTION PRIORITY	Capt. Clapper	Capt. Clapper	2020
INFO			

OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, BUT RATHER CONVENIENCE; IT AFFORDS OUR GROUND ANALYSTS A HEADSTART ON PREPARATION OF POST-MISSION RECOVERY REPORTS, OR SOMETIMES EVEN SAVES THEM WORK IF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES CAN BE PASSED FROM THE ACFT TO USM-7 WHO THEN MUST POKE UP AND TRANSMIT VIA CRITICOMM. EVEN IN THE CASE OF [redacted], NO REAL SUPPORT APPEARS TO BE SERVED BY PASSING AIR-TO-GROUND; THE SAME CONSTRAINING FACTORS FOR FIX-PASSING APPLY, AND TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER INTERCEPT IS THE WORKING TIME LIMIT FOR THEIR EXCHANGE.

5. IN SUMMARY, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS NOT ONLY FEASIBLE, BUT EVEN MANAGERIALLY DESIRABLE TO STOP WHAT APPEARS TO BE A WELL-INTENTIONED, BUT USELESS PROCEDURE -- AND IN DOING SO SAVE OURSELVES, THE FRONTENDERS, AS WELL AS USM-7 SOME AGGRAVATION. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PROPOSAL BROACHED BY [redacted] CONSTITUTES A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM THE "WAY WE'VE ALWAYS DONE IT", BUT IN OUR ESTIMATION THIS IS ALL THE MORE REASON FOR QUESTIONING ITS CONTINUATION. SHOULD CAS ACTUALLY INSTALL, MAINTAIN, AND OPERATE SUITABLE RADIO EQUIPMENT AT LONG TIENG OR OTHER TACTICALLY SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS IN LAOS WITH WHICH OUR ACFT COULD RELIABLY COMMUNICATE VIA LONE-OF-SIGHT, OUR RADIO OPERATION COULD BE REINSTITUTED.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
	[redacted]		4	DO 090941 Z AUG70	[redacted]

SECURITY CLASS

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[redacted]

ROUTINE
R 202355Z AUG 70
FM PACSOTYRGN
TO 6994 SS/DO
DET 3 6994 SS/DO
ZEM
[redacted]

SUBJECT: AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
REFS: A. [redacted] F 47-1467-7 MSG 070145Z AUG 70.
B. DET 3, 6994 SS DO 390412 AUG 70.
IT IS FULLY RECOGNIZED BY THIS HQS THAT THERE IS A CONTINUING LACK OF TIMELY UTILIZATION OF THE TOTAL DET 3 PRODUCT. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM WITH GAS AND THE AF WILL CONTINUE TO BE PURSUED. PENDING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION AND IN SUPPORT OF THE AF/AFSS OBJECTIVE TO MAINTAINING A SELF-SUPPORTING OPERATION, DESIRE YOUR COMPLETE SUPPORT TO MAINTAINING SUCCESSFUL A/G/A COMMS, AT ALL 6994 UNITS.
120

NNNN

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

INT 1-1

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGEFORM CLEAR TEXT (Safeguard message in accordance with AFR 205-1.)	PRECEDENCE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
	PRIORITY	[redacted]

MESSAGE NUMBER	DATE-TIME GROUP	TIME RECEIVED	TIME EDITED	CRYPTOCENTER (Installation etc.)
0450	031925Z	060532Z	060810Z	DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

FROM: PACSCTYRGN

TO: 6994 SCTYSQ/DO

INFO DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ/DO

TDTG: 031833Z SEP 70

[redacted]

SUBJ: AIR/GROUND COMMS.
REF: MY DO 202055Z AUG 70, SAME SUBJ.
1. USAFSS HAS CONCURRED WITH AIR GROUND COMM CONCEPT AS STATED IN REF AND HAS PASSED ON THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WHICH IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION, QUOTE. HEW [redacted] CHIEF WILL BE VISITING DET 3 IN NEAR FUTURE. ESSENTIAL THAT DET 3 CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL VALUE OF ARDF TO [redacted] THROUGH TIMELY RECEIPT AND USE OF PRODUCE BE EMPHASISED. UNQUOTE.
2. [redacted] WAS BRIEFED AT PSR THAT IF [redacted] SHOULD STATE A REQUIREMENT FOR A DSU IN LAOS, AFSS WILL COORDINATE AND ASSIST IN THE PROCUREMENT OF A/G COMM EQUIPMENT AND ESTABISHMENT OF OPERATING PROCEDURES.
GP-1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE [redacted]	COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

AF FORM MAR 57 1013 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM [redacted] GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957 O - 420758

32

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

[redacted]

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

File: INT 1-4

DTG 24/1018Z Sep 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

USAFSS

TO:

INFO: PACSCTYRGN

6994 SCTYSQ

[redacted]

SUBJ: REPORT OF VISIT BY [redacted] 23 SEP 70. [redacted]

FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IAW PAR 4 (A), USAFSS REG 11-4.

[redacted] VISITED THIS UNIT FOR APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS ON 23 SEP. THEY RECEIVED A GENERAL ORIETATION OF THE UNIT WHICH INCLUDED AN OPERATIONAL BRIEFING. TOPICS COVERED WERE AS FOLLOWS: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AIR FRAME, ARDF AND COLLECTION SYSTEM CONFIGURATION, OPERATION, AND CAPABILITY (TO INCLUDE A WALK-THROUGH OF AN EC-47); TASKING CYCLE, AND [redacted] ROLE IN IT, AS WE SEE IT; DESCRIPTION OF A "TYPICAL" MISSION; PROFILE; PRODUCTION (FIX STATISTICS); REPORTING AND ANALYSIS; AND COMMUNICATIONS -- BOTH CRITICOMM/OPSCOMM AS WELL AS OUR AIR/GROUND CAPABILITY.

2. WE DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE POTENTIAL FOR USING THE KY-8 SYSTEM SO THAT FIXES COULD BE PASSED DIRECTLY TO TACTICALLY-SIGNIFICANT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
24	
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	1970
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT CLAPPER/lsh

PHONE: 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: James R Clapper Jr

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF Commander

SECURITY CLA [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV [redacted] ON OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

ABBREVIATED [illegible]INT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED	
ACTION ~~ROUTINE~~ INFO	Capt. Clapper	Capt. Clapper	2020

LOCATIONS IN LAOS. BY WAY OF EXPLAINING THE ACFT - TO - DSU SYSTEM IN VIETNAM, AND ILLUSTRATING OUR CAPABILITY HERE NOW, WE SOUGHT TO CONVEY ITS POTENTIAL APPLICATION IN THE LAOTIAN CONTEXT. [redacted] SEEMED EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THIS AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD, AS A RESULT OF BRIEFINGS HE HAD RECEIVED EARLIER AT PACSCTY RGN, ALREADY CONTACTED [redacted] WHO ALSO INDICATED INTEREST IN ACQUIRING SUCH A CAPABILITY. HE VOICED SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE TIME REQUIRED FOR [redacted] PEOPLE TO MONITOR GROUND KY-8 TERMINALS, IF INSTALLED. WE ASSURED HIM WE WOULD ENDEAVOR TO ESTABLISH WHATEVER PROCEDURES WERE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM, I.E., PASSING FIXES NEAR THE END OF A MISSION OR DURING CERTAIN PRE-COORDINATED TIMES SO THAT ONLY MINIMUM MONITOR TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED OF [redacted] PERSONNEL. HE SAID HE STILL WAS SEEKING APPROVAL OF THIS CONCEPT BY HIS [redacted] AND WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US.

3. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM HERE OF FEEDBACK, BOTH FOR THE FRONT END CREW MEMBERS AS WELL AS OUR OWN. WE STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT MERELY INTERESTED IN GETTING GRATUITOUS PATS ON THE BACK, BUT WANTED SUCH FEEDBACK TO HELP EVALUATE OUR EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPROVE IT ACCORDINGLY IN ORDER TO BETTER SATISFY THE CONSUMER'S (I.E., [redacted] REQUIREMENTS. WE POINTED OUT THAT AS THINGS ARE NOW, WE (MEANING THE TEWS UNIT AS WELL AS OURSELVES) LACKED MUCH INSIGHT

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[redacted]		2	~~2~~ 3	CC 24 Z SEP 70	[illegible]

[redacted]

332

ABBREVIATED POINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SEC [redacted]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	
ACTION			
INFO ROUTINE	Capt. Clapper	Capt. Clapper	2020

INTO [redacted] OPERATIONS AND THE ROLE OUR PRODUCT PLAYS IN THEM. HE SEEMED TO BE VERY IMPRESSED WITH THE EFFORT THAT WAS BEING MADE IN [redacted] BEHALF AND EVINCED INTEREST IN PROVIDING US WITH SUCH FEEDBACK. (TOWARD THIS END, HE INVITED ME TO ATTEND THE [redacted] BRIEFING FOR ADMIRAL SCHULZ, CHIEF, NSAPAC, ON [redacted] OPERATIONS IN LAOS, ON MONDAY 28 SEP).

4. [redacted] ASKED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR OPERATIONS AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES; HE SEEMED GENUINELY INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH US. WE STRESSED THROUGHOUT THAT WE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SATISFY [redacted] REQUIREMENTS, UNDER THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE CRYPTOLOGIC GROUND RULES WHICH GOVERN OUR OPERATIONS.

5. IN SUM, WE FELT THE VISIT WENT VERY WELL, AND [redacted] STATED AS HE DEPARTED THAT IT HAD BEEN MOST ENLIGHTENING AND "MORE THAN RESPONSIVE" TO HIS NEEDS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[redacted]		3	3	CC 24 7 SEP 70	[redacted]

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

591

DO
CC

AA011
RA016
/ROUTINE//
SN 198
 0709472
M 6994 SCTY SO
O DET 3 6994 SCTY SO DO
EM
[redacted]
UBJECT: KY-8 MALFUNCTIONS (U)
N THE PERIOD 26 SEPT TO 5 OCT 70 STATISTICS SHOW OF THE 42
ISSIONS FLOWN, 12 EXPERIENCED KY-8 MALFUNCTION, HFOR A 30 PERCENT
AILURE RATE. THIS RATE IS UNUSUALLY HIGH AND IS CAUSING SOME
ONCERN. ARE YOU EXPERIENCING MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND CAN WE
E OF ANY ASSISTANCE? PLEASE ADVISE.
SO
0198

[redacted]

NN

CC
to det

[redacted]

[redacted]

34

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

SINGLE
X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DTG 09/0930Z OCT 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994TH SCTY SQDN

TO: 6994TH SCTY SQDN/DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

SUBJ: KY-8 MALFUNCTIONS (U)

REF: UR DO0709472 OCT 70

1. THIS UNIT HAS NO MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE KY-8'S ON THE AIRCRAFT OR IN OUR AIR-GROUND RADIO VAN. WE RELY UPON THE 1987TH COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON FOR CRYPTO MAINTENANCE, AND THE 56TH AVIONICS SQUADRON FOR THE AIR CRAFT KY-8'S AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT. WE LACK THE EXPERTISE TO MONITOR HOW WELL THIS SUPPORT IS ACTUALLY RENDERED.

2. HISTORICALLY, WE HAVE REPORTED MANY MALFUNCTIONS AS "KY-8 INOPERATIVE." THIS PHRASE HAS BEEN USED IN THE DURMIS TO TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY COMMUNICATIONS WERE NOT ESTABLISHED BETWEEN OUR AIRCRAFT AND USM-7 AND/OR USA-564. THIS TERMINOLOGY WHILE PERHAPS SUPERFICIALLY CORRECT WAS NOT REALLY ACCURATE; HEREAFTER WE WILL REPORT THESE MALFUNCTIONS AS "UNABLE TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS" VICE "KY-8 INOPERATIVE."

DATE	TIME
09	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT DE LAURA

PHONE: 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis D. Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT USAF

[redacted]

35

DD 1 NOV 65 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO [illegible]

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	
ACTION ROUTINE	CAPT DE LAURA	CAPT DE LAURA	2020
INFO			

UNLESS, OF COURSE THERE IS A TRACEABLE OR KNOWN MALFUNCTION IN EITHER GROUND OR AIR EQUIPMENTS.

3. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, THIS IS NOT A NEW OR A ONE-TIME PROBLEM FOR THIS UNIT. IT HAS PLAGUED US SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE UHF-KY-8 SET UP AT DET 3. OUR MOST RECENT A/G/A STUDY GROUP DEVOTED ITS ENTIRE MEETING TO "THINK-TANKING" THE SUBJECT AND PROFERRING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM. FOR A COMPLETE RECAP OF THE MINUTES OF THIS STUDY GROUP, PLEASE REFER TO MY DO 090800Z OCT 70.

4. WE PLAN TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS WITH COL VERHAGEN DURING HIS VISIT TOMORROW AND AGAIN WITH COL MOSELY WHEN HE VISITS THE DET ON 23 OCT. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF ALL ACTIONS TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM.

5. REGARDING ASSISTANCE, IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, COULD YOU ENSURE(THROUGH LIASION WITH THE 460TH) THAT WHEN ROTATING ACFT DEPLOY TO DET 3, THEIR KY-8 GEAR BE THOROUGHLY CHECKED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, AND IF SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH THE AIRCRAFT'S EQUIPMENT IT IS RECTIFIED BEFORE THE PLANE ARRIVES AT NKP.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		LDL

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

35

[redacted]

ffc

A010
A011
ROUTINE//
N 276
08 10Z
6994SS
DET 3 6994SS DO

[redacted]

[redacted]

BJ: KY-8 MALFUNCTIONS (U)
F: A. OUR DO 070947Z OCT 70
UR DO 092053Z OCT 70
HAVE CONTACTED THE 460TH AND OUR LOCAL MAINTENANCE TO
OROUGHLY CHECK KY-8 EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE TO NKP.
PRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND ACTION IN REF B.
3

Pat the DO on the Head.

Pat, pat
Must have been the "think tank" that got to 'em.

[redacted]

NN

[redacted]

[redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

INT 1

[redacted]

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 14/0915Z OCT 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994TH SCTY SQDN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: PAC SCTY RGN /DO/DC
INFO: 6994TH SCTY SQ/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ: UP-GRADING AIR-GROUND RADIOS, DET 3

REF: DISCUSSIONS DURING VISIT OF COL NOVY AND COL VERHAGEN, 10 OCT 70.

1. DISCUSSIONS WITH PROGRAMS OFFICE, 1987TH COMM SQ HAVE DISCLOSED THAT INITIATING ACTION AT THIS LEVEL TO OBTAIN AWHF ALLOCATION(FOR USE WITH THE G-1186) OR AN FM CAPABILITY(WITH THE KY-8'S) WOULD BE SLOW AND CUMBERSOME. THEY ADVISE THAT IF NORMAL BASE CEM BOARD AND FOLLOW-ON AFCS EQUIPMENT PROGRAMMING PROCEDURES WERE ADHERED TO, IT WOULD BE ON THE ORDER OF 3 TO 6 MONTHS BEFORE WE COULD ACTUALLY OPERATE.

2. THEY RECOMMEND THAT THE MOST EXPEDIENT WAY TO OBTAIN THESE IMPROVEMENTS WOULD BE TO INITIATE THEM FORMALLY AT YOUR LEVEL THROUGH PACAF, PAC COMM AREA AND MACTHAI.

3. AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION, TFA DOES NOT CONTROL

DATE 14	TIME
MONTH OCT	YEAR 70
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2

DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT CLAPPER/LDL — PHONE:

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: James R. Clapper, Jr.

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., CAPT USAF
COMMANDER

SECURITY CLASS [redacted]

[redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

AFD [illegible]

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]
PRECEDENCE ACTION ROUTINE INFO	RELEASED BY CLAPPER	DRAFTED BY CLAPPER
		PHONE 2020

(2) BLOCKS OF FREQUENCIES OTHER THAN C-BAND, FOR RELAYING SENSOR DATA. TFA HAS NO APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR OTHER FREQUENCIES; PRESUMABLY ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY (ASSUMING THE EQUIPMENT IS LOCATED IN OUR AREA) WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT ACTION.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
SECURITY CLAS [redacted]				[redacted]	

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

[redacted]

INT 1-1

ZCZCDVA546
RR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 2010 3080221
ZNY MMNSH
R 040216Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ
ZEM [redacted]

0596

SUBJ: HF CAPABILITY AT NKP
REF YOUR MSG 1403152 OCT 75.
REQUEST YOU ADVISE WHAT HF CAPABILITY (TRANSCEIVERS) TFA
HAS AND IF IT IS ON EXISTING PATCH BOARD.
THIS INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR CONSIDERATION OF HF
ALLOC[redacted]-1136.
270
2013 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

38

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ~~R O U T I N E~~

INFO ~~R O U T I N E~~

DTG 04/0715Z NOV 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN/DCP

INFO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

SUBJ: HF CAPABILITY AT NKP

REF: PSR DCP 040216Z NOV 70 (NOTAL 6994SCTY SQ)

1. REF MSG QUERIES AVAILABILITY OF HF TRANSCEIVERS AT TFA FOR POSSIBLE USE WITH G-1186.

2. TFA HAS THREE KWM2A HF TRANSCEIVERS, TWO OF WHICH ARE ALLOCATED TO 7AF AND 1 TO TFA. THE RADIOS ARE REMOTED FROM THE TFA RADIO ROOM AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE NOT ON THE PATCH BOARD.

DATE	TIME
04	
MONTH NOV	YEAR 70
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Msgt Hart

PHONE 2020

[redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Lewis De Laura, Capt USAF, Operations Officer

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

39

FORM 1 NOV 68 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1968-337-8

ZNY MMNSH
R 222315Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO USM 808
USA 522
USA 522J
USA 32
USA 564
INFO USM 704
USA 561
USASAPAC
ZEM
[redacted]

THIS IS A COORDINATED PSR/ASAPAC MKPZSAGE.
SUBJ: USM-808 COMM TEST (U)
1. PROPOSE A 10-DAY TEST BEGINNING 28, REPEAT 28 OCTOBER 70 INVOLVING USM-808 AND ALL AIRBORNE PLATFORMS (GOT AND LAOS) ON COMFY BRIDLE NET. TEST OBJECTIVES ARE TO DETERMINE PROBLEM AREAS WHICH HAVE RA ULTED IN ALMOST NEGLIGIBLE A/G/A COMMS WITH THAT UNIT. USA-32 WILL TOY A HIGHLY EXPERIENCED COMFY SILK COMM OPERATOR TO USM-808 FOR DURATION OF TEST TO AID IN ALL FACETS OF TEST AND TRAIN USM-808 OPERATORS AS NECESSARY.
2. ACFT WILL ATEEMPT COMMS WITH USM-808 AT SOME TIME DURING EACH ORBIT HOUR. SINCE ALL PLATFORM MONITOR COMFY SILK TO PASS OTHER TACREPS, REPORTS, FYIS, WARNINGS, UPDATES, ETC., USM-808 G/A CALLS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO INITIATE COMMS. USA-564 WILL ASSURE THAT ALL FREQ CHANGES ARE COORDINATED WITH USM-808 VIA OPSCOM. A KEY OBJECTIVE OF TEST IS TO DETERMINE MISSION RELIABILITY OF COMMS. THEREFORE, ABRN OPS WILL LOG TIMES AND ACFT COORDS AT BEGINNING AND END OF ALL SUCCESSFUL COMMS (SERIES OF G/A/G EXCHANGES). TEN-DAY TEST PERIOD WILL COVER ALL POINTS OF ORBITS, SO ACFT COORDS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR UNSUCCESSFUL CONTACT ATTEMPTS.
3. OPERATOR COMMENTS ARE VITAL TO THIS TEST. AT END OF TEST, UNITS WILL FORWARD ALL LOGS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HQ (ASAPAC AND PSR) FOR EVALUATION. USM-808 LOGS SHOULD REFLECT ALL COMMS HEARD DURING TEST, INCLUDING THOSE NOT ADDRESSED TO THEM. USM-808/USA-564 OPSCOM UTILIZATION SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED TO ASSURE VALID RESULTS. COMPREHENSIVE, FRANK COMMENTS INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO HEARABILITY, PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED, SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENT AREAS, AND OPERATORS ESTIMATES OF WHETHER REPORTS COULD HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY PASSED ARE REQUIRED.
4. REQUEST ADVISE IF UNITS ENVISION ANY DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS TEST.
369
0053

DD 2 TX-R
[redacted]

[redacted]

40