

UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

January - June
1970



The EC-47 History Site

[REDACTED]

HISTORY
OF
DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

01 January - 30 June 1970

RCS: USS-D3



30 June 1970

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE


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HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

01 January 1970 - 30 June 1970

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Approved by:



JAMES R. CLAPPER JR., Captain, USAF
Commander

FOREWORD

This history summarizes the continued operational activities of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron. Activities between the unit's beginnings on 04 April 1969 and 31 December 1969 are available in the AU-D5, AU-D5 (USS-1) and USS-D3 Reports for that period.

This history was prepared by TSgt Ronald L. Schofield while fulfilling the position of Unit Historian as an additional duty. All comments and suggestions concerning this history are welcomed and should be directed to the Historian, Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron.

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 30 June 70


Captain William L. Wheeler	Commander (until 07 June 70)
Captain James E. Clapper Jr.	Commander (effective 22 June 70)
Captain Richard T. Osborne*	Operations Officer (Commander from 07 June to 22 June 70)
MSgt Robert E. Edwards	NOOIC Operations
MSgt James G. Overbay	NOOIC Airborne Operations
TSgt Gary G. Davidson	NOOIC Personnel and Detachment First Sergeant (until 12 March 1970)
TSgt Bruce W. Senter	NOOIC Personnel and Detachment First Sergeant
TSgt George E. Coble	NOOIC Communications
TSgt Arthur E. Pierce	NOOIC Exploitation (Departed 01 June 70)
MSgt James F. Hart	NOOIC Exploitation
TSgt Everett A. Sharp	NOOIC Material
SSgt Charles E. Higgins	NOOIC Administration (Departed 30 June 70)
SSgt Larry J. Johnson	NOOIC Administration
SSgt Robert L. Sherwood	NOOIC Security
SSgt Richard A. Moore	NOOIC Mission Management

* Denotes TDY Personnel

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CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

The following is a review of mission, organization and command developments within the Detachment during this reporting period.

Executive

(U) Captain William L. Wheeler, who assumed command of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron on 01 June 1969, continued in this position until 07 June 1970 at which time the command was temporarily assumed by Captain Richard T. Osborne. Captain Osborne held this position until 22 June 1970 at which time he relinquished the command position to Captain James R. Clapper Jr.

Mission

Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron continued as an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) conducting Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and Airborne Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Collection in support of requirements defined by Controlled American Source (CAS), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACT). To fulfill these requirements, the detachment was charged with conducting ARDF and COMINT Collection activities against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Forces operating in Laos. The detachment continued to provide qualified Airborne personnel to operate the USAFSS equipment installed in five EC-47 aircraft which were provided on a rotating TDY basis to Detachment 2, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (later redesignated Detachment 1, 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron).

The detachment's secondary mission of communications support to Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platforms (ACRP) operating over Laos continued throughout this period.

Organization

Throughout this period Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron was directly subordinated to the 6994th Security Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Operational control of the ARDF and Communications Collection effort continued to be exercised by MACV through the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) with technical control exercised by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) through USM-7 and USM-808 which had been designated the Collection Management Authorities (CMA's) for the bulk of the unit's mission. During this period the 6922nd Security Wing was redesignated a Group and dropped from our command lines.

[REDACTED]

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The Command lines were as follows:

Headquarters, United States Air Force Security Service

Headquarters, Pacific Security Region

6994th Security Squadron

Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron

Additional Vans

[REDACTED] The operational complex, which had been housed in six H-1 vans was enlarged two additional H-1 vans. USAFSS advised that two H-1 vans assigned to PACAF and located at NKP were available to the detachment and USAFSS tentatively planned to accept these vans upon confirmation of their condition by this unit. This unit inspected the H-1 vans and notified PSR that their condition was not compatible with available information furnished on them.³ The 6994th Scty Sqdn advised PSR and this unit that there were two comm vans available at Clark Airbase in a configuration which was more suitable for our operational needs. The H-1 vans were configured with all Crypto gear in one van and all teletype equipment in the other. These two vans would provide better utilization of manpower and resources. PSR in turn notified the 6994th Scty Sq, the 6922nd Scty Wg, as well as this unit that the two van configuration at Clark only contained equipment for five terminals, one less than required. PSR then directed the 6922nd Scty Wg to take necessary action to prepare van 55L3522 for shipment to this unit. The 6922nd Scty Wg informed PSR, 6994th Scty Sq, and this unit that H-1 van 55L3522 was being prepared for shipment in compliance with the PSR request. They then informed PSR and this unit that this van had been shipped on 26 Mar 70.⁴

The 6994th Scty Sq notified PSR that the H-1 comm van had been received but that there was no word on the Admin van. They informed PSR that van shells were available at the 6922nd Scty Gp. PSR established a 1 May 1970 completion date for work to support installation of one new comm van, relocation of one existing comm van, and installation of one new admin van. However, they stated that USAFSS desired to activate the category C CRITICOM circuit between this unit and the 6924th Scty Sq by 15 April 1970.¹⁰ They also requested the 6922nd Scty Gp to identify a stripped H-1 Admin van available for shipment to this unit and forward registration number to them.¹¹ In response to PSR's established completion date of 1 May and USAFSS's established date of 15 April for the Category C CRITICOM circuit, this unit queried the NKP BCE on capability to perform all work associated with the installation of the new comm and admin vans. The work was scheduled for completion by 1 May.¹²

[REDACTED]

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PSR requested USAFSS to provide immediate shipping instructions to the 6922nd Scty Gp for priority 1 shipment of H-1 van 55L3516 to this unit. The H-1 van complex could not be reconfigured nor completed until this van was in place; it was to be used to provide the much needed space for this unit's admin function.¹³ USAFSS suggested that Det 3 contact host base officials to determine if the two vans were still available and if so they would request that the host transfer accountability to this unit.¹⁴ Det 3 notified PSR and USAFSS that vans 54L5148 and 55L3532 were still at NKP and that no rehab work had been accomplished by the base, pending disposition instructions. The base advised Det 3 that an estimated eight month period would be required to rehab the vans. This unit suggested shipment of van 55L3516 as scheduled in order to meet established operational dates.¹⁵

In response to our message, USAFSS requested the 6922nd Scty Gp to ship H-1 van R/N 55L3516 on a priority 1 basis to this unit.¹⁶ The 6922nd Scty Gp informed this unit as well as USAFSS that the H-1 van had not been shipped due to a priority backlog and that we would be advised of shipping information as soon as possible.¹⁷ The 6922nd Scty Gp then informed Det 3 that H-1 van R/N 55L3516 had departed Clark Airbase on 30 April 70.¹⁸ We notified PSR that construction on the building extension for the additional two vans should be completed by 18 May 70. Delay in building completion was caused by non-availability of materials on base. The vans would be moved into place as soon as electrical work was completed.¹⁹

On 23 May we notified PSR that construction on the building extension had been completed except for final framing around van openings which must be accomplished after the vans were in place. The installation/upgrade of electrical power lines to vans was still pending receipt of all required materials.²⁰ On 23 June 70, this unit notified PSR that the comm equipment was fully operational and that all work on the van complex had been completed.²¹

[REDACTED]

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Personnel Authorization

■ Officers

AFSC	Authorized	Assigned
AS035	1	1
Total	1	1

Enlisted Personnel

AFSC	Authorized	Assigned
202X0	12	13
203X1	5	3
291X0	4	2
29292	1	1
292X1	20	32
301X3	6	5
363X0	1	0
645X0	2	1
702X0	2	1
732X0	1	1
Total	54	59

[REDACTED]

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CHAPTER II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

(U) The following is a historical account of all pertinent activities within the Airborne Operations Section of this Detachment during the period of this report.

Mercury Grass Collection

[REDACTED] This unit's mission, as well as RVN-based missions possessing Zulu configured Combat Cross aircraft, were to search for and record VHF multi-channel Mercury Grass signals while flying assigned areas on a time available basis.²² The purpose of this was to determine the extent of Mercury Grass Comms along the Laos/NVN border.

While this unit participated in conducting the Mercury Grass search, three weaknesses in aircraft configuration were found to hinder this effort. These weaknesses were corrected immediately. They were:

a. The G-276 Demods had been removed from several CCZ aircraft. This unit was essential to adequate operator technique in intercepting and analyzing Mercury Grass for subsequent reporting.

b. When the G-276's were installed and connected, the G-175 receiver must be monitored through the G-276 while zero tuned. This over restricted the flexibility of the system while the operator searched for and copied non-FDX signals, (i.e., LVHF, R1XX).

c. In order to adequately record Mercury Grass if more than channel 1 and 2 are active, the G-176 must be operated at 15 IPS. This capability did not exist on the CCZ configured aircraft.²³

VHF Intercept in PDJ Area Laos

[REDACTED] DIRNSA was interested in NVA Tactical activity in the PDJ and thought that a great deal of VHF transmissions should have been available. They stated that VHF intercept since commencement of ^{the} PDJ Offensive (12 Feb 70) had been extremely sparse considering the amount of NVA Tactical activity.²⁴

After a thorough review with the linguists, this unit's and USM-7's analysts could only conclude that VHF Comms were not and had not been used to any great extent in the PDJ area. This unit had accomplished approximately 2700 minutes of search by competent and highly qualified linguists in the PDJ area on a weekly basis. These operators constantly searched from the 10 to 90 MHz range and were tipped off by the Morse operators on any voice encountered in

[REDACTED]

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the .2-10 MHz range. Whenever voice intercept was obtained the aircraft began orbiting in the vicinity and remained there until the transmitter signed down. Full technical data was maintained on all voice copied and efforts were made to obtain as much copy as possible.

Discussions with USS-7 analysts indicated that [REDACTED] also enjoyed little success in intercepting these comms with mobile ground intercept teams and that the high point in Tactical VHF comms was reached just prior to and during the PDJ Offensive when approximately 17 or 18 messages were obtained on a daily basis. The small amount of VHF intercept which had been obtained by airborne intercept had been primarily if not exclusively GDRS related with a very small percentage being Tactical. Very little chatter had been noted and what intercept which was obtained had been primarily four figure, low grade crypto systems.²⁵

Test of Cherry Sheet Validity

[REDACTED] The 6994th Scty Sq felt that added target emphasis would improve the missions launched from NEP. A test of the Cherry sheets validity was necessary in order to prove this theory. The late 615 Bravo mission was selected to test the Cherry Sheet's validity by flying strictly on the basis of the Cherry Sheet with a CCE aircraft. The AMS was to coordinate with the Navigator to position the aircraft in the optimum area for cherry sheet priorities. The ARDP operator and Y position were to coordinate to ensure that only cherry sheet targets were worked for DF. All other targets were to be checked rapidly and referred to the Zulu positions for copy, if time was available, and as appropriate. This action was based on the assumption that Cherry Sheet targets are only targets of priority, or are of the highest degree of interest.²⁶

The test of the Cherry Sheets validity was conducted on 06 and 07 April respectively.²⁷ One mission was flown each day and crew members were permitted to work only those targets on the Cherry Sheet. The aircraft were positioned in close proximity to the targets during a period encompassing ten minutes prior to, and ten minutes after, the predicted schedule times. The mission on 06 April did not obtain any fixes on Cherry Sheet targets while the mission on 07 April only obtained one fix. This was a clear indication that Cherry Sheet target information was not up to date.

Vietnamese Voice Intercept

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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configured. They inquired as to how much the ARDF mission would be degraded if the task was primarily collection.

We reported that the Zulu configured EC-47's have two collection positions, one of which is configured with one HF and one VHF receiver (for a total search range of .2 to 90 MHz). This position was normally manned by a Vietnamese or Laotian Linguist.

Even though weather in the Barrel Roll area had caused several diversions to less productive areas, we had nonetheless experienced a decided increase in voice collection starting in late March. When collecting low powered voice signals, the aircraft must orbit in the immediate vicinity of the transmitter. This requirement often worked in direct opposition to the ARDF effort, unless the DF target was in the same area. Because of this, we counseled that careful consideration be given to the relative need for low level voice collection against ARDF requirements when the aircraft tasking is issued.

This unit recognized the value of voice traffic and expeditious handling of it. Our linguists quick scan voice tapes after the aircraft recover and extract possibly exploitable messages which were forwarded to USM-7 electrically. During the period 1 thru 13 April a total of 30 possible exploitable voice messages were electrically forwarded to USM-7 with the longest time lapse between time of aircraft recovery and transmission of messages being three hours and two minutes. Tapes were then forwarded to USM-7 daily via C-130 courier aircraft for complete transcription and processing. Tapes recorded one day were to have arrived at USM-7 at approximately 1200 hours the following day.

EC-47 Aircraft at NKP

[REDACTED] On 1 May 1970, the Royal Thai Government gave their approval for retention at NKP in FOB status of the two EC-47 aircraft based here on extended TDY since the fall of 1969.

Down Loading/Up Loading Zulu Consoles

[REDACTED] Due to the then current operational activity at the 6994th Scty Sq, an urgent requirement existed for increasing the number of Zulu missions flown by that unit. Because of the existing shortage of Zulu consoles and in order to fulfill urgent requirements for increasing Zulu missions, this unit was tasked with uploading/downloading the Zulu consoles at NKP to avoid having Zulu consoles committed to aircraft transitioning to and from this unit. At the time it was thought that this requirement would only last thirty to sixty days depending on the receipt of additional Zulu consoles which were due at the 6994th Scty Sq during either May or June. Due to insufficient manning, this unit was unable to

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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support this increased tasking. In order to alleviate this situation Detachment 1 identified two qualified maintenance personnel and Detachment 2 identified one for a sixty day TDY to this unit.¹

Effective 8 May 70, all aircraft ferried to and from NKP were CC configured aircraft. And on this date Det 3 accepted the responsibility for downloading and uploading the Zulu consoles on the aircraft.²

Operational Test of RFP in Airborne Platform

[REDACTED] Tentative planning for a USAFSS test of ARFP was scheduled.³
This test was to include the following:

ARMY was to loan one complete LEFAIR KNEE RFP System to the 6994th Scty Sq by 01 August 70.

A two week installation and engineering check-out was to be required at the 6994th Scty Sq. Then a test of the system was to be conducted for 30 days on a Z console on an aircraft operating from NKP. This test was scheduled to begin about 15 September 70. The test was designed to determine intelligence value of LEFAIR KNEE data collected during an ARFP mission in terms of utility, speed and accuracy of analysis. The test personnel were to be selected by the 6994th Scty Sq and were to include one operator-analyst and one test engineer.

This unit was to be tasked with securing ERV (C) and MACV (J-2) support for the test effort, which could require detasking of Zulu position(s) and providing analyst training for the operator-analyst.⁴

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PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS

(January thru June)

	January	February	March	April	May	June
Hours Fraggd	321:50	354:10	767:00	620:00	620:00	600:00
Hours Flown	327:45	328:45	713:20	572:00	613:00	602:10
Percent Flown	100	93	93	92	93	100
Targets Worked	1246	1392	1577	987	1064	1131
Targets Fixed	801/64%	961/69%	1231/77%	769/78%	800/75%	892/79%
Number with Calls	494	531	596	399	547	682
Manual Morse Exploitable Messages	732	780	837	483	649	468
Minutes Manual Morse Copy	19578	17679	20224	19402	22411	21327
Radiotelephone Exploitable Messages	74	25	82	153	558	571
Minutes Radiotelephone Copy	1076	764	1153	5157	7240	7293
Targets Copied	4234	3432	3722	3564	3633	3635

[REDACTED]

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CHAPTER III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

[REDACTED] The following is an account of all pertinent activities within the Analytical and Reporting Section of this Detachment during the period of this report.

During early February, with the loss of temporary duty 203MD personnel, it became necessary to drop full decryption and quick scan of all exploitable messages which were intercepted by the mission aircraft. In an attempt to accomplish as much as possible with our limited resources, we began using analytical personnel to accomplish decryption of only those systems which were most likely to contain perishable or TACREP information. This procedure was used as much as possible until the volume of voice intercept, combined with the already large volume of Morse messages, reached a point where only about 10-20% of the messages intercepted were decrypted. This process was discontinued when the code system data base became obsolete and manning levels further deteriorated. During this period, most code systems were not fully posted and there were many active systems that were being intercepted but for which we did not have a data base.

During early April, the 202 manning situation became even more critical and continued to deteriorate to the point where ground analysts were frequently required to work frozen eight and twelve hour shifts. Also during this same period, the airborne analysis section was frequently able to man only 3 of the 4 aircraft launched daily, and the analyst who flew the mission had to accomplish all processing of EMR's after recovery of their respective missions. Most ground development work which had been accomplished by airborne personnel had to be reduced and then finally discontinued in late June. This acute shortage of personnel was due to the loss of personnel through TDY terminations, 30 day special leaves, PCS rotations and R&R's. A complex data base system on technical operating characteristics and crypto systems which had taken almost one year to develop was discontinued after every effort was made to retain it.

ARDF Recovery Reports (ARR)

[REDACTED] Informally, Task Force Alpha requested copies of our ARDF Recovery Reports to be used for briefing Forward Air Controllers. The FAC's would reconnoiter the areas where this unit obtained fixes to verify enemy activity at those locations. The ARR is a raw SIGINT Technical Report which does not have the benefit of GMA editing and corrections and at times, it contained information that subsequently had to be rescinded or modified. Thus NSAPAC Rep Vietnam (C) decided not to approve providing TFA with it. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam (C) believed that the best interests of all were served by utilization of existing and applicable SIGINT Product Reports, such as USM-7's and USM-808's DVCSIR and USA-564's TACREPs, all of which were received by TFA. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam (C) felt that apparently, TFA had SIGINT requirements which were either

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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new or which they felt were not being adequately satisfied³⁵

In view of the established SIGINT Policy of not providing Technical information to consumers, the 6994th Scty Sq agreed with HRV (C) that ARR's should not be provided to TPA. However, in order to insure that they received timely ARDF information, the 6994th Scty Sq suggested they be provided with a sanitized version of the ARR (i.e., TUD/RO, Fix location and time)³⁶

Processing of USA-564 ARDF Reports

[REDACTED] During the February visit of Brigadier General John, Vice Commander, USAFSS, and Hqs USAFSS staff representatives, [REDACTED] (C) staff personnel and members of General John's party discussed the analytical capability of this unit to process ARDF fixes for identification. His staff maintained that only four per cent of the identifications of fixes were changed subsequently by USM-7. Since this low percentage did not tally with the ten-day random sample previously evaluated last November, nor with spot checks made at [REDACTED] (C) from time to time by comparison of this unit's ARR to USM-7's DVCSLR, a study of fix/cut material was undertaken to determine true extent of the analytical contributions made by USM-7 in processing our ARR's. The comparison yielded the following pertinent statistics:

- a. This unit reported a total of 538 fixes/cuts in the sample.
- b. USM-7 changed the identifications reported by this unit on 288 fixes/cuts (53.3 per cent).

Sources of details which made the re-identifications possible were attributable to off-line wideband retrieval of critical TEXTA details, mostly callsigns. Thus, the results were not taken as a demonstration of inaccurate performance or careless omissions on the part of this unit, nor was there anything manifested in the study indicating the non-availability at this unit of technical material necessary to the identification processes. This is borne out by the fact that most identifications to reference designator by this unit were not changed by USM-7. The study did, however, demonstrate that a considerable service to U.S. Mission Laos and DI 7/13th AF could be provided by altering the current USM-7/USA-564 product reporting standards. It was suggested by the study that TACREP criteria be changed to require reporting only of identified targets which had been validated by USM-7. The balance, mainly those isolated and up-graded by wideband retrieval, would then be reported only in the DVCSLR, or if thought necessary, by TACREP or SPOT on significant identifications retrieved on wideband, prior to issuance of the DVCSLR.³⁷

The conclusion and resultant recommendations were of some concern since they were not in consonance with statistics developed by DIRNSA. The percentages informally mentioned during the staff visit were based on analysis of information provided by NSA. During the period of the comparison, NSA credited this unit with identifying 177 fixes, USM-7 with 11 identifications, and wideband with 30

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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identifications of the 629 fixes obtained. Compilations for the prior period of 5 July through 28 November 1969 showed this unit obtaining 2,301 fixes and identifying 494, USM-7 identified 42 and wideband 11, while NSA identified 87.

The demonstrated capability of this unit was evidenced by these statistics. It was thought that any changes in TACREP procedures would unnecessarily degrade the timeliness of support to Tactical Commanders and would be ill advised.

[REDACTED]

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FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. 6994 Scty Sq msg, dtg 160900Z Feb 70 [REDACTED].
2. PACSCTTRGN msg, LOSX, dtg 040214Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
3. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, CC, dtg 090901Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
4. 6994 Scty Sq msg, DC, dtg 160255Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
5. PSR msg, DCP, dtg 170138Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
6. PSR msg, LOSX, dtg 170219Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
7. 6922 Scty Wg msg, LO, dtg 190619Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
8. 6922 Scty Wg msg, LOS, dtg 010403Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
9. 6994 Scty Sq msg, LOS, dtg 040713Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
10. PSR msg, DEP, dtg 090054Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
11. PSR msg, LOSX, dtg 102057Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
12. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, CC, dtg 110130Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
13. PSR msg, LOSX, dtg 160216Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
14. USAFSS msg, LOSCA, dtg 161725Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
15. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, LOS, dtg 210805Z Apr 70 (UNCLAS [REDACTED]).
16. USAFSS msg, LOSCA, dtg 212057Z Apr 70 (UNCLAS [REDACTED]).
17. 6922 Scty Gp msg, dtg 300733Z Apr 70 (UNCLAS [REDACTED]).
18. 6922 Scty Gp msg, dtg 040852Z May 70 (UNCLAS [REDACTED]).
19. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, CC, dtg 170615Z May 70 (UNCLAS [REDACTED]).
20. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, DC, dtg 240105Z May 70 (UNCLAS [REDACTED]).
21. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, CC, dtg 241005Z June 70 [REDACTED].

Chapter II

22. US4-704 msg, IAPVACC, dtg 190710Z Feb 70 [REDACTED].
23. Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq msg, DC, dtg 200336Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
24. DIRNSA msg, B61-344, dtg 280143Z Feb 70 [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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25. USA-564 msg, DORTX, dtg 020945Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
26. 6994 Scty Sq msg, OC, dtg 160228Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
27. 6994 Scty Sq msg, DOR, dtg 300035Z Mar 70 [REDACTED].
28. [REDACTED] msg, dtg 100345Z Apr 70 [REDACTED], Dec 1.
29. USA-564 msg, DC, dtg 170720Z Apr [REDACTED], Dec 2.
30. [REDACTED] msg, F47/0683-70 F47/D-253-70, dtg 010740Z May 70 [REDACTED], Dec 3.
31. 6994 Scty Sq msg, LO, dtg 020301Z May 70 [REDACTED] (P-1), Dec 4.
32. 6994 Scty Sq msg, LO, dtg 040819Z May 70 [REDACTED] (P-4), Dec 5.
33. NSA msg, K23-1909, dtg 032017Z Jul 70 [REDACTED].
34. 6994 Scty Sq msg, DORM, dtg 270126Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].

Chapter III

35. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [REDACTED] msg, F461-3196-70, dtg 250729Z May 70 [REDACTED], Dec 6.
36. 6994 Scty Sq msg, DOR, dtg 260800Z May 70 [REDACTED], Dec 7.
37. [REDACTED] msg, F47/0194 F47/D-066-70, dtg 030615Z Feb 70 [REDACTED], Dec 8.
38. USAFES msg, CV, dtg 062215Z Feb 70 [REDACTED], Dec 9.

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GLOSSARY

A

ACC
ACRP

ADMIN

AF

AFS

ARDF

ARFP

ARR

ARDF Coordination Center
Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platform or Program
Administration
Air Force
Airborne Mission Supervisor
Airborne Radio Direction Finding
Airborne Radio Finger Printing
ARDF Recovery Reports

C

CAS

CC

CCZ

CIA

COMINT(s)

COMINT

CRITCOM

Controlled American Source
Combat Cross
Combat Cross Zulu
Collection Management Authority
Communication(s)
Communications Intelligence
Critical Intelligence Communications

D

DF

DI

DIRNSA

DVCSLR

Direction Finding
Directorate Intelligence
Director, National Security Agency
Daily Vietnam Communist SIGINT Location Report

E

ER

Exploitable Message Report

F

FAC

FDM

Forward Air Controller
Frequency Division Modulation or Multiplex

G

GDRS

General Directorate Rear Services

H

HF

High Frequency

I

IPS

Inches Per Second

L

LVHF

Low Very High Frequency

M

MACT

MACV

Military Assistance Command, Thailand
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

[REDACTED]

Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

^M
MRZ
^{II}
MR II

Megahertz
Military Region Two

^{II}
NKP
[REDACTED]

Nakhon Phanom
[REDACTED]

NGV [REDACTED]

National Security Agency Pacific Representative
Vietnam [REDACTED]

NSA
NVA
NVE

National Security Agency
North Vietnamese Army
North Vietnam

^I
PACAF
PCS
PDJ
PSR

Pacific Air Force
Permanent Change Station
Plaines Des Jarres
Pacific Security Region

^{II}
RD
RFP
R/R
RVM

Reference Designator
Radio Finger Printing
Rest and Recuperation
Republic of Vietnam

^E
SIGINT

Signal Intelligence

^I
TACREP
TEXTA
TFA
TDY
TUD

Tactical Report
Technical Extracts Traffic Analysis
Task Force Alpha
Temporary Duty
True Unit Designator

^{II}
U.S.
USAFSS

United States
United States Air Force Security Service

^V
VHF

Very High Frequency

APPENDIX ONE

TO

DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

DBS-D3

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

(Captain William L. Wheeler)

Captain William L. Wheeler was Commander, Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. He assumed this position in June 1969.

Captain Wheeler came to this position from the Air Force Special Communications Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, where he was assigned as a Center Evaluation Analyst in the Directorate of Electronic Warfare.

He was born January 29, 1941, in St. Joseph, Mo., where he still makes his home. He was commissioned in January 1964, upon graduation from the University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., and was assigned to the 6940th Technical Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. He is a 1968 graduate of the Squadron Officers School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

After graduating from Signals Intelligence Officer School at Goodfellow, he was assigned to the 6927th Security Squadron as a Flight Commander. Later, he worked with Detachment 1, 6927th Security Squadron and at Torii Station was a branch chief at the Joint Sobe Processing Center until May 1967. After a period as Command Briefing Officer and acting aide-de-camp for Major General Louis E. Coira, he became a Center Evaluation Analyst for the Air Force Special Communications Center.

Captain Wheeler graduated from the University of Missouri with a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology in 1964. Shortly after graduation from the University of Missouri, Captain Wheeler married the former Peggy E. Parker of Columbia, Missouri. They have one daughter Kelly E. born 4 February 1968.

(Photo of Commander, Captain William L. Wheeler, not available)

APPENDIX THREE

TO

DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

USS-D3

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

(Captain James R. Clapper Jr.)

Captain Clapper assumed command of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand on 22 June 1970.

He was born on March 14, 1941, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He graduated from high school at the Nurnberg American High School, Nurnberg, Germany in 1959; received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Maryland in 1963, and a Master of Arts Degree from St. Mary's University in 1970.

He was commissioned as a distinguished graduate in the Air Force ROTC program, and was assigned initially to the USAFSS School at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. Following graduation from the Officers Signal Intelligence Course in March 1964, he was assigned to the Air Force Special Communications Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. In December 1965, he was assigned to Headquarters 2nd Air Division (later 7th Air Force), Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN as a Watch Officer and Desk Analyst in the Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Upon his return to the CONUS, he served as Aide to the Commander, USAFSS, for approximately three years.

Captain Clapper is a graduate of Squadron Officers School, Class 67-C.

(Photo of Commander, Captain James R. Clapper Jr., not available)

[REDACTED]
Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- Doc 1. [REDACTED] msg, dtg 100345Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
- Doc 2. USA-564 msg, DO, dtg 170720Z Apr 70 [REDACTED].
- Doc 3. [REDACTED] msg, F47/0683-70 F47/D-253-70, dtg 010740Z May 70 [REDACTED].
- Doc 4. 6994 Scty Sq msg, LO, dtg 020301Z May 70 [REDACTED] GP-1).
- Doc 5. 6994 Scty Sq msg, LO, dtg 040501Z May 70 [REDACTED] GP-4).
- Doc 6. NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [REDACTED] msg, F461-3196-70, dtg 250729Z May 70 [REDACTED].
- Doc 7. 6994 Scty Sq msg, DOR, dtg 260900Z May 70 [REDACTED].
- Doc 8. [REDACTED] msg, F47/0194 F47/D-066-70, dtg 030615Z Feb 70 [REDACTED].
- Doc 9. USAFSS msg, CV, dtg 062215Z Feb 70 [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER													
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				INT 1-4 28													
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE														
		XX															
PRECEDENCE				170720Z													
ACTION ROUTINE																	
INFO																	
FROM: [REDACTED]				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS													
TO: [REDACTED]																	
CAS VIETIANE																	
<p>[REDACTED] DO</p> <p>SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE VOICE INTERCEPT.</p> <p>REF YOUR 100345Z APR 70/</p> <p>1. ZULU CONFIGURED EC-47'S HAVE TWO COLLECTION POSITIONS ONE OF WHICH IS CONFIGURED WITH ONE HF AND ONE VHF RECEIVER (FOR A TOTAL SEARCH RANGE OF .2 TO 90 MHZ). THIS POSITION IS NORMALLY MANNED BY A VIETNAMESE OR LAOTIAN LINGUIST.</p> <p>2. EVEN THOUGH WEATHER IN THE BARREL ROLL AREA HAS CAUSED SEVERAL RECENT DEVERSIONS TO LESS PRODUCTIVE AREAS, WE HAVE NONETHELESS EXPERIENCED A DECIDED INCREASE IN VOICE COLLECTION STARTING IN LATE MARCH. WHEN COLLECTING LOW POWERED VOICE SIGNALS, THE AIRCRAFT MUST ORBIT IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE TRANSMITTER. THIS REQUIREMENT OFTEN WORKS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE ARDF EFFORT UNLESS THE DF TARGET</p>																	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE		<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">DATE</td> <td style="text-align: center;">TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">17</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">MONTH</td> <td style="text-align: center;">YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">APR</td> <td style="text-align: center;">70</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">PAGE NO.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">NO. OF PAGE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>		DATE	TIME	17		MONTH	YEAR	APR	70	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGE	1	
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[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]															

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

IS IN THE SAME AREA. BECAUSE OF THIS, CAREFUL CON-⁷
SIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE RELATIVE NEED FOR LOW
LEVEL VOICE COLLECTION AGAINST ARDF REQUIREMENTS WHEN
THE AIRCRAFT TASKING IS ISSUED.

3. RECOGNIZE VALUE OF VOICE TRAFFIC AND EXPEDITIOUS
HANDLING THEREOF. LINGUISTS THIS STATION QUICK SCAN
VOICE TAPES AFTER THE AIRCRAFT RECOVERS AND EXTRACT
POSSIBLE EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES WHICH ARE FORWARDED TO
USM-7 ELECTRICALLY. DURING THE PERIOD 1 THRU 13 APR
A TOTAL OF 30 POSSIBLE EXPLOITABLE VOICE MESSAGES
HAVE BEEN ELECTRICALLY FORWARDED TO USM-7 WHICH THE
LONGEST TIME ELAPSE BETWEEN TIME OF AIRCRAFT RECOVERY
AND TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES BEING THREE HOURS AND
TWO MINUTES. TAPES ARE THEN FORWARDED TO USM-7 DAILY
VIA C-130 COURIER AIRCRAFT FOR COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTION
PROCESSING. ACCORDING TO CURRENT SCHEDULE TAPES
RECORDED ONE DAY SHOULD ARRIVE AT USM-7 AT APPROXIMATELY
1200 HOURS THE FOLLOWING DAY. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING
THAT UNDER RECENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND USM-7 [REDACTED],
[REDACTED] TRANSLATORS ARE PROCESSING ALL USA-564 TAPES FOR-
WARDED TO USM-7

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIAL
SEC					

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NAAP02 GRAB06

//PRIORITY//

SSN 36

P 020301Z

FM 6994 SOTYSQ

TO DET 1 6994HSOTYSQ(LOW)

DET 2 6994 SOTYSQ(LOW)

DET 3 6994 SOTYSQ(LOW)

ZEM

LO

SUBJ: TDY OF MAINT PERSONNEL.

1. FOR ALL: DUE TO CURRENT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY, AN URGENT REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR INCREASING THE NUMBER OF ZULU MISSIONS FLOWN BY THIS UNIT. BECAUSE OF EXISTING SHORTAGE OF ZULU CONSOLES THIS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY UPLOADING/DOWNLOADING ZULU CONSOLES AT DET 3 RATHER THAN HAVE ZULU CONSOLES TIED UP IN ACFT WHICH ARE TRANSITIONING TO/FROM DET 3. ANTICIPATE THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WILL ONLY LAST THIRTY TO SIXTY DAYS DEPENDING ON RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL ZULU CONSOLES WHICH ARE DUE IN TO THE 6994SS DURING MAY/JUNE. PRESENT MANNING AT DET 3 IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THIS INCREASED TASKING WHICH WILL COMMENCE WITH THE UPYAD OF ACFT 158 (WITH THE ZULU CONSOLES FROM ACFT 950) ON 8 MAY 1970.

2. FOR DET ONE: IN ADDITION TO PRESENT TDY TASKING, IDENTIFY AND ALERT TWO QUALIFIED MAINT PERSONNEL FOR A SIXTY DAY TDY TO DET 3.

3. FOR DET 2: IN ADDITION TO PRESENT TDY TASKING, IDENTIFY AND ALERT ONE QUALIFIED MAINT MAN FOR A SIXTY DAY TDY TO

4. FOR DETS ONE AND TWO: ADVISE THIS HQ SOONEST BY TELEPHONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS SELECTED TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT IN ORDER THAT NECESSARY ORDERS MAY BE CUT. PERSONNEL WILL TRAVEL TO TAN SON NHUT VIA IN COUNTRY TRAVEL ORDERS TO ARRIVE HERE NOT LATER THAN 7 MAY, RPT MLT 7 MAY, AND WILL TRAVEL TO DET 3 ON ACFT 158 ON 8 MAY. TDY ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED TO THESE INDIVIDUALS UPON THEIR ARRIVAL HERE AT TSN. PERSONNEL SELECTED WILL HANDCARRY THEIR MEDICAL AND STAN/EVAL RECORDS TO DET 3. CP-1

300

LO

E
000000
//ROUTINE//
SSN 101
R 000000
FM 6994SCTYSQ
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ
ZEN/460 TRW
INFO ZEN/560 TRW
ZEN/6994SCTYSQ DORT
ZEN/6994SCTYSQ LOW
ZEN

100
9934

000000 DOR LO MAY 70.

- SUBJ: TURN AROUND ACFT AT NKP.
1. EFFECTIVE 05 MAY 70, ACFT FERRIED TO AND FROM NKP WILL BE "CC" CONFIGURED.
 2. DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DOWN LOADING/UP LOADING ZULU CONSOLES AT NKP.
 3. 6994SCTYSQ (LO) WILL PROVIDE THREE ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE MEN TOY FOR 60 DAYS TO DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ TO ASSIST IN ADDED WORKLOAD. THESE MEN WILL USE THE "CC" ACFT DEPARTING TSN ON COMWAY FOR TRANSPORTATION TO NKP.
 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE PROCEDURES WILL PROVIDE FOUR (4) ADDITIONAL ZULU CONSOLES FOR UTILIZATION BY THIS UNIT AND SHOULD NOT EFFECT RESOURCES AT DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ. HOP-4.

(X)

NNNN

Lo

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012 R K
[REDACTED]
NAA012

QRA016

//PRIORITY//

SSN 803

P 260800Z

FM 6994 SCTYSQ

TO DET3 6994 SCTYSQ

INFO DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ

ZEM

453
[REDACTED] DOR MAY 78.

SUBJ: DISTRIBUTION OF RECOVERY REPORTS.

REF DET 3 DO 180920Z, MY DOR 200601Z AND NRV (C) F461-3196-78, DTG 250729Z.

IN VIEW OF ESTABLISHED SIGNIT POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING TECH INFO TO CONSUMERS, AGREE WITH NRV (C) THAT THE ARR SHOULD NOT BE PROVIDED TO TFA. HOWEVER, TO INSURE THEY RECEIVE TIMELY ARDF INFO, SUGGEST YOU PROVIDE THEM WITH A SANATIZED VERSION OF THE ARR I.E. TUD/RO, FIX LOCATION AND TIME. IN VIEW OF INFO CONTAINED NRV (C) REF, REQUEST IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION.

100
[REDACTED]

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NNNNZCZCZVA7620AA901
RR YADVIZ
DE YVADOK 63 2372530
ZKZK RR ZLA RVI DE
R 262215Z ZFF1
FM USAFSS
TO DIRNSA/K13
INFO NSAPAC
NSAPACREP VIETNAM

CGUSAPAC
CGUSASA
6922 SOT YNG
6994 SOT YSO
PAC SOT YRGN
USA-627
USA-7
USA-564
CHIEF USAFSS/FM
ZEN

SUBJECT: PROCESSING OF USA-564 ARDF REPORTS
REFERENCE [REDACTED] MESSAGE 030615Z FEB 70
1. THE CONCLUSION AND RESULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ARE OF SOME CONCERN SINCE THEY ARE NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH STATISTICS DEVELOPED BY YOUR AGENCY. THE
PERCENTAGES INFORMALLY MENTIONED DURING CITED STAFF VISIT
WERE BASED ON ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY NSA. DURING
THE VISIT, [REDACTED] IN REFERENCE MESSAGE, NOW CITED
USA-564 WITH IDENTIFYING 177 FIXES, USM-7 WITH 11 IDENTIFICA-
TION. COMPILATIONS FOR THE PRIOR PERIOD OF 5 JUL THRU
28 NOV 69 SHOWS USA-564 OBTAINING 2,381 FIXES AND IDENTIFYING
494. USM-7 IDENTIFIED 42 AND WIDEBAND 11. NSA IDENTIFIED 87.
2. THE DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY OF USA-564 IS EVIDENCED BY
THE ABOVE STATISTICS. ANY CHANGES IN TACREP PROCEDURES THAT
WOULD UNNECESSARILY DEGRADE THE TIMELINESS OF SUPPORT TO
TACTICAL COMMANDERS WOULD IN THE VIEW OF THIS COMMAND BE
ILL-ADVISED.

250

File
INT
90
02

File
CH2147



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