CHECO Report September 1970, Page 10

CHAPTER THREE

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IN SEA ARDF

Considerations of sensitivity preclude any detailed description of all the duties and functions of each crew member; however, each EC-47 mission was not necessarily limited to a "single function," e.g., ARDF. Airborne radio direction finding was indeed the primary mission for the EC-47's in South Vietnam, but extensive COMINT (Communications Intelligence) collection was also routinely conducted on a daily basis from aircraft properly configured for the purpose.

The 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing Manual 55-1, discussing the types of missions flown, stated:

The primary fixing mission objective is fixing enemy
radio transmitters. The entire mission is planned to
obtain the maximum number of high quality fixes.

The primary collection mission objective is to copy
the text of enemy transmissions. Although targets are
fixed on these missions, it is only accomplished when
it does not interfere with the "Z" operator's perfor-
mance of his duties. Keeping the aircraft in range of
the transmitter that the "Z" operator is working takes
precedence over fixing.

The fact that COMINT (by air, ground, or naval facilities) was conducted was not unknown to the enemy. In his own words (from a CICV document on Enemy Electronic Warfare Capabilities) the enemy used it himself, and stated that the goals of technical EW reconnaissance were accomplished "through direction finding, monitoring, and exploitation of all information collected on communication sysems, voice and Morse."

The same document, in a CICV conclusion, said that:

. . . It is not known how much electronic warfare
has aided the enemy, but it must be concluded that
if the NC/NVA are able to monitor friendly commu-
nications, they have the potential to exploit any
compromised information.

It is a prime precept in any intelligence gathering agency (even nore so that in operational intelligence or long-range analyses) that "you don't compromise your cover." For this reason, EC-47 COMINT activities, conducted by USAFSS personnel, were kept strictly on a need-to-know basis, requiring an SI Category II clearance. The front end crews, aircraft commander, copilot and engineer (when carried) had to have Top Secret clearances, but not SSIR. The one link between front and back end crews was the navigator, until August 1970, when authoriaztion was received to grant appropriate clearances to the front end crews as well.

460TH TEWS CREW MAKEUP

In the early days of the EC-47 work, the flight crews were made up predominantly of experienced and mature field grade officers, (80:20 ratio) many of whom had already accumulated considerable C-47 experience.

By mid-1970 this situation had changed to the point where the experienced/ inexperienced ratio was approximately 40:60, the majority of front-end crews coming directly from UPT (Undergraduate Pilot Training), with no experience whatever in the venerable Gooney, and little or none in reciprocal engine tail wheel type aircraft. According to the 460th TRW, mission effectiveness was not diminished during the period of change.

The younger pilots EC-47 upgrading started them out in the right seat as copilots, but, by the completion of their tour, most had been upgraded to the left seat as first pilots or aircraft commanders. It was not uncommon for them to log 1,000 flying hours in the EC-47 during their years's tour. For most missions the use of a flight engineer was discontinued, thus reducing gross weight (an increasingly important problem as more equipment was added) by 220 pounds, and, in addition, helping to solve the manning problem by deleting 45 spaces in the face of increased force reduction.

During the period covered by the first CHECO EC-47 report, Phase I navigator training was accomplished in the CONUS, but it was subsequently discontinued. At the time this study was written, all EC-47 navigator training was being accomplished in the combat area, in what was literally OJT, under the watchful instruction of standardization and evaluation navigators, supplemented by frequent checks by flight examiners. This reliance on OJT was necessitated by the lack of any arena in the United States that could effectively simulate the actual combat theater and experience.

Page Eleven

Return to Directory